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Abstract 
This thesis consists of four empirical essays on international trade and development 
economics with a special focus on African countries. Given that Africa has been largely 
marginalized from international trade for decades, the research is a timely and important 
contribution to both the trade and development literature in the context of Africa. The 
general empirical framework used throughout is a gravity equation model.  Given the nature 
of panel data used in this thesis and following the latest developments in the literature on 
the estimation of the gravity model the thesis includes a comprehensive set of exporter-
importer, exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects to address potential sources of 
omitted variable bias. The results offer several interesting findings that are summarized 
briefly below.   
The first essay documents that while reciprocal trade agreements increase exports of 
participating African countries, non-reciprocal trade agreements decrease them. Specifically, 
the effect of African reciprocal trade agreements on member countries’ trade is about 50% 
less in comparison to non-African countries. The non-reciprocal trade agreements decrease 
African exports twice as much as those of the non-African counterparts. The possible 
explanation for this result is a weaker effect of African trade agreements due to the existence 
of higher non-tariff barriers (e.g., rules of origin and quantity standards); a policy 
recommendation is to widen and deepen the reciprocal preferential trade agreements.  
The second essay investigates the effects of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) on African 
trade. It documents a greater impact on exports is observed in those countries who actively 
participate in deeper regional integration. The finding suggests that deepening and widening 
regional trade agreements are essential for member countries’ sustainable future export 
growth.  
The third essay documents that migration in general is positively related to home exports 
and imports, but the African migrants have no statistically significant effect on their home 
countries’ exports. By comparison, Asian migrants have a positive and significant impact on 
their home countries’ exports. In addition, the results also reveal that African migrants 
promote exports of homogeneous goods, while Asian migrants facilitate exports of 
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differentiated products. Both African and Asian migrants positively and significantly impact 
their home countries’ imports from the migrants’ destination countries.  
The fourth essay documents that service trade increase income in the service sector. To 
address the endogeneity of the service trade share, geographic variables are used in a 
bilateral gravity regression in the first stage to extract the exogenous components of the 
service trade share that was used as an instrument in the second stage. 
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I. Introduction 
This thesis consists of four empirical essays on international trade and development 
economics with a special focus on African countries. Part I contains two essays on the impact 
of reciprocal and non-reciprocal trade agreements on African export, and the impact of intra-
African trade agreements on export flows. Part II contains an essay that investigates the 
impact of African migration on their home countries’ exports and imports. Part III 
investigates the impact of trade in services on service income at the cross country level. 
Chapter 2 of Part I empirically investigates the impact of reciprocal vis-à-vis non-reciprocal 
trade agreements on the export flows of African countries. This topic is important because 
the Africa’s share of export relative to the rest of the world is very small and decreasing 
despite proliferation of African trade agreements. Although this striking feature has received 
attention to the African trade economists, no systematic investigation has so far been made. 
This research attempts to fill this gap by investigating which type of trade agreements 
increase African exports. It employs a gravity model to estimate a five-year interval panel 
data of 153 countries for the 1970-2010 period. The issue of endogeneity due to omitted 
variables is addressed. 
This chapter documents that African reciprocal trade agreements increase member 
countries’ exports while the non-reciprocal trade agreements decrease the same. However, 
the positive effect of African reciprocal trade agreements is about 50% less in comparison to 
non-African countries. The negative effect of the non-reciprocal trade agreements is twice 
as much as those of the non-African countries. These results thus suggest that both 
reciprocal and non-reciprocal trade agreements perform worse in Africa and can be justified 
by the fact that the export share has been stagnated at around 10% among African countries 
over decades. These findings are in line with Goldstein et al. (2007) and Özden & Reinhardt 
(2005) regarding the relative effect of reciprocal and non-reciprocal trade agreements on 
African export performance but contradict Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) and Rose (2004).  
One of the main reasons for trade reduction of non-reciprocal PTAs might be the well-
documented existence of stringent Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs), such as the rule of origin and 
related administrative restrictions. Studies such as Candau & Jean (2005), Hoekman & Özden 
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(2005), Mold (2005), and Grant & Lambert (2008) show that due to NTBs, fewer than 
available opportunities are utilised, although countries mostly tend to use the preferences 
granted to export their products. One policy implication of these findings is that widening 
and deepening reciprocal preferential trade agreements are essential to enhance Africa’s 
export growth.  
Chapter 3 of Part I assesses the impact of the various African RTAs on their members’ trade 
flows. Currently most African countries are exerting an ongoing effort to deepen and widen 
African regional trade agreements aiming for establishing a continental wide free trade area 
by 2017. As a result, this topic is interesting and timely given the importance of regional 
trade agreements in spurring growth in the event of very low intra-regional trade share in 
Africa.   
Using a comprehensive dataset of 153 countries for the period of 1970 to 2010, I found 
robust evidence that that all trade blocks in Africa increase trade, albeit with varying degrees.  
While the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community 
of Central African States (ECCAS) trade blocks increase trade by as much as 256% and 153% 
respectively, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), the South African 
Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), and the East African Community (EAC) increase their member countries’ exports 
by 30% to 90%.  Importantly, I empirically show that a greater impact on exports is observed 
in those countries who participate in more advanced forms of regional integration. 
Nevertheless, the current share of African export to the world is very small. Africa has the 
potential to meet its food needs through intra-African trade. Yet at the moment the 
continent is importing 95% of its food needs from elsewhere. According to the World Bank, 
this is a loss of more than $52 billion a year in trade in values that Africa could potentially 
retain within its borders. This reveals that Africa is the only region on earth that lags behind 
in creating broad regional trading blocs. As such, the growth-fostering potential of trade 
blocs in Africa is almost untapped. The issue of endogeneity is carefully addressed. 
The creation of wider and deeper efficient regional trading blocs can significantly spur 
African growth.  Regional trade blocs are crucial elsewhere in promoting export and fostering 
economic growth and prosperity. For example, studies indicate that had EU not integrated 
five decades ago, the average per capita income of each country would have been one-fifth 
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lower than it is today (Baldwin, 1994 & Sarker & Jayasinghe, 2007). This implies that 
deepening and widening the regional integration in Africa has a significant potential to spur 
the exports and economic growth of member countries.   
In Part II, Chapter 4, the impact of African migration on their home countries’ imports and 
exports is evaluated.  The possible trade creation effect of migrants is one of important topics 
of interest among the development economists. This chapter departs from the existing 
literature in that it places special attention on Africa, uses bilateral trade and bilateral 
migration stocks and flows of a large sample of countries, and introduces bilateral, exporter-
year and importer-year fixed effects in estimation in order to address the endogeneity due 
to omitted variables. It also compares the impact of migration in Africa with the Asian region. 
A gravity mode is estimated using a ten-year interval panel data of 136 countries for the 
period ranging from 1970 to 2010.  
In line with earlier studies, the results reveal that in general migration positively affect 
exports and imports. However, African migration has no statistically significant effect on 
their home countries’ exports while Asian migration has a positive and significant impact. It 
is also found that African migration promotes exports of homogeneous goods, while Asian 
migration facilitates exports of manufactured and differentiated products. More precisely, a 
10% increase in the number of Asian migrants increases their home country exports to 
destination countries by 0.7%. However, both African and Asian migrations positively and 
significantly impact on their home countries’ imports of both homogenous and 
differentiated products from the destination countries.  
The last essay in Chapter 5 of Part III investigates the causal relationship between trade in 
services and service income. This topic is interesting as service trade has been growing at a 
higher rate than merchandise trade since early 1980s and has now become the largest sector 
of the world economy. In 2014, 71% of the world’s GDP consisted of the service sector. 
Nonetheless, research on the effect of service trade is scant, and this chapter is intended to 
fill the gap. Using a rich data of bilateral service trade, this paper estimates the causal effect 
of service trade on service per capita income for 95 countries in 2000, 2005, and 2010.  
To account for the endogeneity of service trade, an instrumental variable approach is 
undertaken. Geographic variables are used in a bilateral gravity regression in the first stage 
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to extract the exogenous components of the service trade share that was used as an 
instrument in the second stage. This instrument strongly predicts the actual service trade 
share and fares better than the common approach in the literature such as Frankel & Romer 
(1999), Irwin & Terviö (2002) and Noguer & Siscart (2005). The results show that a one-
percentage-point increase in the service trade share leads to 0.1% to 0.4% increase in the 
service per capita income. The result is robust with the inclusion of various geographical and 
institutional controls specific to the service trade.  
Chapter 6 provides an overall conclusion. 
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Part I 
Empirical Assessments on the Impact of African 
Trade Agreements  
II. Does reciprocity in trade agreements matter? – Empirical 
Evidence from Africa 
2.1 Introduction 
Africa is a resource-rich continent, yet many of its people still live under the poverty line. 
However, the second largest continent in the world has recently experienced an 
unprecedented economic resurgence.1  Over the last 10 years specifically, Africa’s growth 
has matched or surpassed East Asia’s growth. According to the Economist, for the 2001-2010 
period, six of the world’s fastest-growing economies were situated in the sub-Saharan Africa 
region.2  Since most of the recent African economic boom is believed to be driven by African 
trade, promoting African trade has been a priority among African policy-makers and 
researchers.  
Recently a number of changes regarding African external trade ties have taken place. Former 
colonial powers’ established dominance in terms of trade share in Africa is falling rapidly 
while the south-south trade link (specifically Africa’s trade with emerging and developing 
countries) is rising rapidly. Europe’s historical colonial relationship with Africa mainly focused 
on extraction of raw materials and is often cited as the main reason for African trade 
marginalisation.3  
1 According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s 2012 report, the first decade of the twenty-first century 
has been characterised as the “decade of Africa’s economic and political renewal”. It is for good reason that the Economist 
featured “Africa Rising” in a late 2011 cover headline.   
 
2 See the daily chart in the Economist’s “Africa’s impressive growth” online report on January 6th 2011. The online link is: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/01/daily_chart.  
 
3  The colonial infrastructure facilitated the convenient extraction of raw materials out of Africa, while the infrastructure 
networks within and between African countries are almost non-existent, resulting in low intra-African trade. For example, 
the communication infrastructure between African economies was so poor that to make calls between Ghana and Sierra 
Leone it was necessary for the Ghanaian person to call an operator in London to call an operator in Paris to connect the 
Ghanaian to the person in Sierra Leone. Moreover, the continent’s four centuries of slave trade distorted the natural trends 
of the continent innovations and specialisation in commodity exports in which it has comparative advantages. All these 
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The increasing share of Africa’s trade with emerging countries reveals the gradual 
diminishing influence of colonial powers on African trade. The reduction in African exports 
to developed economies has been replaced by an increase in African exports to emerging 
and developing economies. On the other hand, intra-African trade is significantly low, 
constituting only 10% of their total exports and increasing very slowly. Figure 1 reveals 
Africa’s small and stagnant world trade share against the rise that is evident in emerging and 
developing countries.4  
Figure 1: World Export Shares of Africa since 1948 
 
 
Source: IMF DOT 
Developed economies provide access to non-reciprocal preferences for African economies. 
In addition, reciprocal trade agreements that are established based on the principle of 
reciprocity or symmetry are also prevalent.5 The non-reciprocal (unidirectional or 
force the continent to specialise mainly on the export of raw materials, halting the African economy and linkages between 
economic activities. 
 
4 Recently, there has been gradual but slow increase in the transport infrastructure within certain African countries. 
 
5 These agreements include regional General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) agreements. For example, in case of 
Africa the reciprocal RTAs include EAC, COMESA, ECCAS, CENSAD, SADC and ECOWAS. 
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asymmetrical) preferences are typically granted for exports from a group of less developed 
or emerging countries to a single country with a larger market.6 Despite violating the most 
favoured nation (MFN) principle, the GATT/ WTO’s 1979 Enabling Clause makes it legal for 
non-reciprocal agreements such as the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and other 
preferential agreements to exist under the GATT/WTO system.7 Theoretically, the primary 
intention of the Special and Differential Treatment is to increase the participation of less 
developed countries in the global trading system, by granting access to larger and more 
competitive markets (Ornelas(2016),  Bartels, 2003; Bouët, Jean & Fontagne, 
2005; Goldstein, Rivers & Tomz, 2007; & Zappile, 2011).8 The list of non-reciprocal 
preferences available for Africa appears in Table 3.  
However, despite the proliferation of trade agreements in Africa, Africa’s share in the world’s 
total export is very small. Therefore, it is interesting to systematically analyse the impact of 
reciprocal vis-à-vis non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements on African exports. 
Specifically, this paper answers the following question: which type of trade agreements help 
to increase African countries export? To achieve this, the study employed a gravity model on 
a five-year interval panel dataset of 153 exporting countries for the period 1970 to 2010. 
This research uses similar methodology as Baier & Bergstrand (2007) and Gil-Pareja, Llorca-
Vivero, & Martínez-Serrano, (2014), that addresses issues related to endogeneity.9 The 
gravity model used in this study includes exporter-importer, exporter-year and importer-
year fixed effects to capture all possible types of omitted variables. Additionally, the model 
also included preferential trade areas’ (PTAs) lagged and forward effects. Furthermore, the 
rising effect of emerging countries’ trade with the world is also captured with the use of the 
most recent years in its dataset.  
6 These include non-reciprocal trade agreements such as GSP, ACP, the EU’s recent Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, 
the United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Cotonou, and the CBI. 
 
7 The legality of non-reciprocal PTAs is based on their inclusion under the Special and Differential Treatment. The Special 
and Differential Treatment provisions offered via the GSP or other preferential agreements are the primary tools for less 
developed countries to offset costs of entry and competition associated with joining the global market and the (World 
Trade Organisation) WTO. 
 
8 However, some studies indicate that major powers are using this type of arrangement as a means to extend market 
access, reinforce reforms, and foster other partnerships with less developed country regions. 
 
9 I used similar methods except that the trade agreements dataset is retrieved from Jeffrey Bergstrand’s webpage 
(http://www3.nd.edu/~jbergstr/) and authors’ compilation for the most recent years. 
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I find that the reciprocal trade agreements increase African exports, while the non-reciprocal 
trade agreements decrease exports. The findings are comparable to Goldstein et al. (2007) 
and Özden & Reinhardt (2005) regarding the relative effect of reciprocal and non-reciprocal 
trade agreements on African export performance. Yet, they are not in line with Rose (2004) 
and Gil-Pareja et al.’s (2014) findings. It is worth mentioning that the comparison of our 
findings and findings of Rose (2004) and Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) must be put in perspective. 
There exist major differences in terms of the methodology and time span of sample data 
used.  For example, Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) included zero trade flows in their estimations 
while we excluded them. This study differs from Rose (2004) as it employs a different 
method, time span and also includes all non- preferential trade agreements in the dataset 
while in Rose (2004) only the GSP schemes were included. 
Given the explicit goal for non-reciprocal agreements, the negative effect of non-reciprocal 
agreements on trade seems contradictory. Nevertheless, this research’s findings are in line 
with arguments made by economists such as Bhagwati (2008). The possible justification for 
this research’s results is that non-reciprocal agreements may be trade-diverting (the 
proliferation of such agreements undermine the effort to advance free trade), while 
reciprocal agreements may be trade-creating because they do not interfere with the current 
international trade regime (Bhagwati, 2008; Özden & Reinhardt, 2005; & Zappile, 2011). We 
conclude that deepening and widening reciprocal trade agreements while simultaneously 
developing sound and favorable reciprocal and non- reciprocal trade agreements with the 
rest of the world is essential for Africa’s sustainable future export growth. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 deals with data and methods. The analysis 
of the results is provided in section 2.3, while section 2.4 concludes. 
2.2 Data and Methods 
2.2.1 Data 
The gravity model was estimated on a five-year interval panel dataset of 153 exporting 
countries for the period from 1970 to 2010.10 The nominal bilateral trade data was collected 
from UN COMTRADE while the nominal gross domestic product (GDP) was collected from 
10 The full list of countries included in the study are presented in Annexure A1. 
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the World Development Indicators. Distance and other control variables were collected from 
CEPII Database, and the data for PTA was taken from Jeffrey Bergstrand’s webpage and the 
author’s compilation.11 The nominal values of export flow and GDP are scaled by exporter 
GDP deflators to generate the respective real values.  The total number of observations was 
93,075. Zero trade flows are excluded because the log of zero is undefined, which consists 
of about 20% of the data.12 
2.2.2 Estimation Method 
The econometric model used in this chapter is the gravity model with exporter-importer, 
exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects. The random effect was considered to be less 
plausible because it assumes a zero correlation between the unobservable and the PTA. 
Moreover, past empirical studies reveal overwhelming evidence for the rejection of a 
random effects gravity model relative to a fixed effect gravity model, using either bilateral-
pair or country-specific fixed effects (Egger, 2000 & Baier & Bergstrand, 2007).  I also run a 
Hausman test and found that the chi2(1)= 6.89 and Prob>chi2 =0.01 implying the rejection 
of the random-effect model in favour of the fixed effects gravity model (Hsiao, 2014 and 
Baltagi, 2008). 
Theoretically, the source of endogeneity bias in gravity equations is unobserved time 
invariant heterogeneity.13 Trade flow between countries is also determined by the ratio of 
‘bilateral’ to ‘multilateral’ trade resistances in addition to the conventional economic and 
distance variables (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007).14  
 
11 For non-reciprocal trade agreements, the data is arranged in such a way that the exporter countries are recipients 
while the importer countries grant preferences. 
 
12 Although the method of handling the issue of zero trade flows is discussed and used in papers such as Eichengreen & 
Irwin (1995), Felbermyer & Kohler (2006) and Liu (2009), this research drops zero trade flows from the sample following 
Baier & Berstrand (2007), because the issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
13 There are some variables (bilateral and multilateral resistance terms) that can potentially affect trade but these are not 
observable for the researcher. Since these variables are likely to be correlated with PTA, they are best controlled for using 
bilateral fixed effects.   
 
14 The factors that contribute to endogeneity bias are omitted variable, simultaneity, and measurement error. 
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We adopted a baseline OLS gravity model specification, as shown in Equation (2.1) below.15 
ܮ݋݃൫ܧݔ݌௜௝௧൯ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܮ݋݃(ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧) + ߚଶܮ݋݃(ܩܦ ௝ܲ௧) + ߚଷܮ݋݃(ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝) + ߚସܥ݋݊ݐ݅݃௜௝
+ ߚହܮܽ݊݃௜௝ + ߚ଺ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝ + ߚ଻ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝ + ߚ଼ܲܶܣ_ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧
+ ߚଽܲܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ + ߚଵ଴ܴܶܣ_ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ + ߚଵଵܴܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧
+ ߝ௜௝௧ଵ  
(2.1) 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
Log (Expijt): the log of country i export to country j at time t. 
Log (GDPit) and Log (GDPjt): the GDP of country i and country j at time t respectively. 
Log (Distij): the log of distance between the trading pairs. 
Contigij: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs share common borders. 
Langij: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs have a common language. 
Currencyijt: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs have common currency. 
Landlockedij: a dummy variable on whether either the exporter or the importer or both are 
landlocked countries. 
ܲܶܣ_ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧: a dummy variable on whether the exporter i (i.e. the recipient) is African, 
and  signs a non-reciprocal trade agreement with importer j (the country that grants the 
PTA).  
ܲܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧: a dummy variable on whether the exporter i is non-African and signs a 
non-reciprocal trade agreement with importer j. 
ܴܶܣ_ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs are African countries and 
have reciprocal trade agreements.   
ܴܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs are Non-African 
countries and have reciprocal trade agreements. 
It is important to note that PTAs (given by developed countries to developing countries) are 
non-reciprocal agreements between African and Non-African countries. Although the RTAs 
are mainly within Africa, there are a handful of African countries who are also members of a 
number of cross regional FTAs such as Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA) and Protocol on 
15 Many of the elements of the trade-cost function, such as geographical, cultural, or historical characteristics are 
intrinsically time-invariant. Fixed effect is thus preferred. To correct for possible check heteroscedasticity, I used robust 
standard errors throughout. OLS and panel regressions assume that errors are independent and identically distributed while 
the robust standard errors option relax these assumptions. 
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Trade Negotiations (PTN).16 In the regressions, I ignore them as their inclusion will not 
significantly affect the coefficient of estimation to change the inferences made in any 
meaningful way.  
 I estimated OLS specification with and without time dummies as a baseline comparison, 
although the OLS estimations provide inconsistent and biased coefficient estimates. 
Therefore in an alternative specification of the gravity model I took the third-party effects 
into consideration, using bilateral fixed (ߚ௜௝) effects with or without time dummies. However, 
bilateral fixed effects will not capture time varying effects that might potentially bias the 
coefficient estimates as they fail to properly address the endogeneity between export and 
trade agreements. Thus, the preferred gravity specification I use include exporter-importer-
, exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects.  
Some of the determinants of trade agreements, such as the presence and absence of trade 
agreements, include variables such as size and similarity of GDPs, proximity of trading pairs 
between themselves and the rest of the world, and the relative difference in factor 
endowments between themselves and the rest of the world, and also tend to explain trade 
flows between countries. In other words, the presence or absence of trade agreements is 
endogenous. Hence, when left uncorrected, the problem of endogeneity may over- or under-
estimate the coefficients of interest. In other words, in gravity estimations, the error term 
may represent unobservable policy-related barriers in the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity in trade flow determinants associated with the likelihood of signing a trade 
agreement (Baier & Bergstrand, 2004; 2007).17   
Theoretically, omitted variables, simultaneity, and measurement errors can cause 
endogeneity. However, studies justify that the most important source of endogeneity in the 
gravity study of trade agreements is the omitted variable (and selection) bias. The best 
method to remove measurement error bias is the creation of a continuous variable that 
would more precisely measure the extent of trade liberalisation from various trade 
16 Such agreements can be found from the WTO – Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS) database that 
can be access using http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx. 
 
17 For example, two countries might have extensive unmeasurable domestic regulations (e.g, internal shipping 
regulations) that inhibit trade. 
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agreements. If the trade agreements only remove the bilateral tariff rate alone, one could 
quantify them using the change in the tariff rates. However, in practice, trade agreements 
go beyond tariff reduction, as it may develop into internal regulations and other non-tariff 
barriers.  The calculation of such measure is beyond the scope of this chapter and may be a 
useful future research direction. I adhere to the default 0-1 measure of the presence of trade 
agreements as has been used over the last four decades (see also Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). 
The possibility of simultaneity bias can be argued to be insignificant. The growth literature 
reveals that GDP is theoretically endogenous to bilateral trade flows. However, some definite 
explanations exist for generally disregarding potential endogeneity of GDP and export.  
Firstly, GDP is a function of net multilateral exports, which on average tends to be less than 
5% of a country's GDP, and its connection to gross exports is much less direct. Secondly, the 
gravity equation relates bilateral trade flows to countries' GDPs, which are a very small share 
of a country's multilateral exports. Thirdly, previous studies indicate that the potential 
endogeneity of GDPs with export is insignificant (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). However, we 
also account for the potential endogeneity of GDPs with export using a regression with GDP 
on the left hand side, as shown in equation (2.3) hereunder. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) point out that the estimation of the border effects has 
the problem of the omitted variable bias if the multilateral trade resistance terms that 
capture the idea that trade choices are established on relative rather than absolute prices 
are not controlled.18 In a panel setting, the presence of country-pair and country-year 
dummies can be employed to treat endogeneity arising from the omission of multilateral 
trade resistance terms (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007 & Gil-Pareja et. al., 2014). 
The gravity specification with bilateral fixed (ߚ௜௝), exporter- year (ߚ௜௧) and importer- year (ߚ௜௧) 
fixed effects shown in equation (2.2) takes into consideration the multilateral trade 
resistances, and hence addresses the main concern of the issue of endogeneity due to 
omitted variable bias discussed above.  
18 Note that McCallum (1995) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) used cross-section trade for their study of the border 
effect, and the explanatory variable of interest is a dummy that is equal to one if the bilateral trade flow is interprovincial 
trade, and zero if it is state-province trade. In Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) theoretical model the multilateral 
resistance term is a function of bilateral trade barriers, which in turn depend on bilateral distance and the border dummy.  
As a result, without controlling the multilateral resistance we obtain a biased estimate of the border effect.   
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ܮ݋݃൫ܧݔ݌௜௝௧൯ = ߚ଴ + ߚ௜௝ + ߚ௜௧ + ߚ௝௧ + ߚ଺ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝௧ + ߚ଻ܲܶܣ஺௙௥௜௖௔௜௝௧
+ ߚ଼ܲܶܣே௢௡஺௙௥௜௖௔௜௝௧ + ߚଽܴܶܣ஺௙௥௜௖௔௜௝௧ + ߚଵ଴ܴܶܣே௢௡஺௙௥௜௖௔௜௝௧ + ߝ௜௝௧ଶ  
(2.2) 
As done in other studies, this research also imposes the unitary income elasticity restriction 
by scaling the left hand side variable by the product of the real GDP of the country-pairs as 
shown in equation (2.3) below. This procedure assists in testing the existence of simultaneity 
between export and GDPs. However, as shown in Column 2 of Table 2, scaling or not scaling 
export flows by real GDPs will not affect the coefficient estimates of the trade agreements. 
It only changes the values of coefficient estimates of the intercept term, the exporter-year 
and importer-year fixed effects. 
ܮ݋݃ ቆ ܧݔ݌௜௝௧ܩ݀݌௜௧  כ ܩ݀݌௝௧ቇ
= ߚ଴ + ߚ௜௝ + ߚ௜௧ + ߚ௝௧ + ߚ଺ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝௧ + ߚ଻ܲܶܣ஺௙௥௜௖௔௜௝௧
+ ߚ଼ܲܶܣே௢௡஺௙௥௜௖௔௜௝௧ + ߚଽܴܶܣ஺௙௥௜௖௔௜௝௧ + ߚଵ଴ܴܶܣே௢௡஺௙௥௜௖௔௜௝௧ + ߝ௜௝௧ଷ  
(2.3) 
In addition, virtually every trade agreements is typically “phased-in” over a 10-year period 
(Baier & Bergstrand, 2007).19 As a result, I also included two lagged levels of the FTA 
dummies.  
2.3 Results 
The analysis of the results begins with the ordinary least square (OLS) and fixed effect 
estimation of atheoretical gravity equation that ignores multilateral price terms. It is dealt 
with in section 2.3.1. However, this kind of specification is biased because it ignores 
multilateral price terms. As a result, it is essential to have estimations that take multilateral 
trade resistances terms into account. The estimation results that take into account the 
theoretically motivated fixed effect estimation of gravity equation with multilateral price 
terms and phase in agreements is presented in section 2.3.2. The results in relation to the 
19 The entire effects of trade agreements on export flow cannot be captured in concurrent years only. Trade agreements 
alter the terms of trade, which tends to have lagged on trade volumes. As a result, trade agreements might also have effects 
a few years after they are phased in. If the trade agreements changes are strictly exogenous to trade flow changes, future 
trade agreements should be uncorrelated with the concurrent trade flow, meaning that the coefficient of future 
agreements should be economically small and statistically not significant to zero. 
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literature is discussed in section 2.3.3. 
2.3.1 Atheoretical gravity equation: Fixed Effects and OLS estimations ignoring 
multilateral price terms 
The baseline gravity specification corresponding to column 1 and column 2 of Table 1 is OLS, 
while column 3 and column 4 show the fixed effect estimates with bilateral effects. The 
corresponding coefficient estimates of reciprocal and non-reciprocal PTAs for both African 
and non-African countries are reported in Table 1. Column 1 is the baseline scenario where 
no fixed or year dummies are considered.  
All control variables have expected coefficient signs. The results show that exporters and 
importers’ real GDP have a value close to unity, while distance has a coefficient estimate of 
-1.16. The theory suggests that the coefficient estimate for the real GDP variable should be 
unity (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). Similarly, contiguity, landlocked, common language, and 
currency have expected signs.  
The OLS coefficient estimate of the reciprocal African PTA is 0.88 without year dummies, and 
it is 1.17 when year dummies are incorporated. However, the year dummies do not control 
for the endogeneity of PTAs. When we allow for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneities 
using bilateral country-pair fixed effects, the value becomes 0.36, that is almost half of the 
baseline scenario. The result when both bilateral fixed effects and year dummies are 
included reveals a coefficient estimate of the PTA to be 0.39. The estimate suggests that the 
average treatment effects of the presence of a PTA between country-pairs is an increase of 
trade by 48% (e0.39 – 1 = 0.48). The corresponding estimate using the baseline OLS estimate 
is 141% (e0.88 - 1 = 1.41), an increase that is roughly a three times overestimation of the 
coefficient of interest (Table 1).  
The reason for overestimation of OLS coefficients might be due to the omission of variables 
such as the percentage of informal cross border trade that might have positive correlation 
with both trade and RTAs. In other words, in such a situation, each of the estimated 
coefficients consists of the ’true’ coefficient plus an omitted variables bias. When the 
omitted variable is positively correlated with the dependent variable and the covariance 
between the RTA and the omitted variable is greater than 0, this results in an upward or 
positive bias of the coefficient estimates. In other words, they result in overestimations of 
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the RTA coefficients of the OLS regressions.  
Table 1: Gravity equation coefficient using various specifications 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
ܲܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ 0.01 0.22*** -0.23*** -0.16*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ܲܶܣ_ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ -0.10** 0.03 -0.43*** -0.41*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
ܴܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ 0.42*** 0.60*** 0.05* 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
ܴܶܣ_ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ 0.88*** 1.17*** 0.36*** 0.39*** 
 (0.0784) (0.0791) (0.0773) (0.0780) 
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௜௧) 1.05*** 1.09*** 0.88*** 0.94*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௝௧) 0.81*** 0.82*** 0.68*** 0.70*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
ܮ݋݃(ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝) -1.16*** -1.16***   
 (0.01) (0.01)   
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݃௜௝ 0.58*** 0.51***   
 (0.04) (0.04)   
ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝ -0.52*** -0.48***   
 (0.02) (0.02)   
ܮܽ݊݃௜௝ 0.78*** 0.79***   
 (0.02) (0.02)   
ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝ 0.85*** 0.88***   
 (0.06) (0.06)   
Constant 5.49*** 5.27*** -1.07*** -2.15*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.28) 
Observations 86,207 86,207 86,207 86,207 
R-squared 0.61 0.62   
Within R-squared   0.24 0.24 
The gravity includes     
   ɴt No Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴij No No Yes Yes 
   ɴt нɴij No No No Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.The dependent variable is the (natural log of the) real 
bilateral trade flow from country i to country j. 
Similarly, the baseline coefficient estimate of the non-reciprocal African PTA is -0.10 without 
year dummies, and it is 0.03 when year dummies are incorporated. When we adjust for the 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneities by using bilateral fixed effects, the value 
becomes -0.43 (that is almost four times larger than the baseline estimation). Column 4 
provides results using both bilateral fixed effects and year dummies, which results in a PTA 
coefficient estimate of -0.41. The estimate suggests that the average treatment effects of 
the presence of a PTA is a 34% (e-0.41 – 1 = -0.34) decrease of export between trading pairs. 
The corresponding estimate using the baseline OLS estimate is a decrease of 10%  (e-0.10 - 1 
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= -0.10), implying that the baseline OLS estimation overestimates the magnitude of the 
coefficient of our interest  by more than three times (Table 1). 
Comparing reciprocal and non-reciprocal trade agreements, we can say that reciprocal 
African trade agreements increase exports while the non-reciprocal agreements decrease 
exports. However, the specification that leads to the results of Table (1) are likely to be 
biased since the specification employed suffers endogeneity issues that arise from ignoring 
multilateral price terms. The estimation results that take the multilateral price terms into 
account are presented in section 2.3.2 hereunder. 
2.3.2 Theoretically motivated gravity equation: Fixed effect estimation with multilateral 
price terms and phase-in agreements 
We now estimate equations (2.2) and (2.3) using bilateral country-pair fixed effects to 
account for variation in distance, contiguity, landlockedness, common language, and 
currency, along with exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects to account for variations 
in real GDPs and the multilateral price terms. We also introduce lagged effects of PTAs on 
expected export flows, as shown in the coefficient estimates reported under columns 3-5 of 
Table 2. The institutional nature of PTAs is the economic reason for including lagged changes 
of PTAs. The PTA variable dummies were constructed using the “Date of Entry into Force” of 
the agreement, but they fail to take into account the phase-in effect of the agreements, since 
most PTAs are typically “phased-in” over 10 years. Furthermore, the lagged effect accounts 
for terms-of-trade changes that are a result of the introduction of PTAs, since they tend to 
have lagged effects on trade volumes. The forward PTAs take care of the issue of exogeneity. 
An insignificant coefficient value for the forward PTAs reveal that the forward PTAs are 
uncorrelated to the concurrent trade flow, and hence exogenous. This assumption implies 
that explanatory variables in each time period are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error 
ߝ௜௝௧ in each time period. Trade may increase or decrease (postponed) in expectation of trade 
agreements, because infrastructure and distribution systems comprising sunk costs are 
redirected. In other words, the forward trade agreement dummies confirm that there are no 
feedback effects from trade changes to trade agreement changes (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). 
In column 1 the reciprocal RTA coefficient is 0.64, indicating that the reciprocal RTAs on 
average increase exports by 90%. The results of Column 1 and 2  shows that African RTAs 
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perform well in comparison to non- African counterparts but it is misleading as this 
specification fails to take into account the change in terms of trade effect of signing trade 
agreements that needs to be captured through the introduction of lagged terms. The 
regression results that include the lagged effects are presented in columns 4 and 5. In log 
linear form, the variation in the logs of real GDPs is captured by the country and year effects. 
The result in column 4 reveals that the sum of the Average Treatment Effects (ATEs) for the 
RTA is significant and positive, but it is one-third lower than the baseline estimation, implying 
that the baseline overestimates the magnitude of the RTA coefficients. An analysis of the 
significant ATEs column 4 reveals that reciprocal RTAs only increase trade by 22%. 
Conversely, the coefficient of non-reciprocal PTAs (ܲܶܣ_ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧) shows that they have 
positive but statistically insignificant coefficients. The positive coefficient value might be due 
to the fact that firms initially respond to non-reciprocal trade agreements in anticipation that 
the agreements might yield benefits. However, as shown in the analysis of ATEs in column 4, 
over a 10-year period (the sum of the ATEs – the contemporaneous plus two lags of five years 
interval), non-reciprocal PTAs decrease trade by as much as 47% (Table 2).  Note that when 
imposing the restriction of unitary income elasticity as presented in equation (2.3), the 
coefficient estimate of RTAs remains the same (the result shown in column 2). 
Table 2: Gravity equations with bilateral fixed and country time effects 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ܲܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
First Lag   -0.12*** -0.03 -0.04 
   (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
Second Lag    -0.13*** -0.22*** 
    (0.05) (0.05) 
Forward     -0.18 
     (0.04) 
ܲܶܣ_ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.21** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) 
First Lag   -0.30*** -0.19* -0.23* 
   (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) 
Second Lag    -0.44*** -0.49*** 
    (0.08) (0.09) 
Forward     -0.20 
     (0.17) 
ܴܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.18*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
First Lag   0.13*** 0.11*** 0.19*** 
   (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Second Lag    0.14*** 0.08 
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    (0.04) (0.05) 
Forward     0.04 
     (0.04) 
ܴܶܣ_ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.24*** -0.03 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) 
First Lag   0.28*** 0.20** 0.26** 
   (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) 
Second Lag    0.01 -0.02 
    (0.09) (0.12) 
Forward     0.03 
     (0.14) 
Constant 14.69*** -5.771*** 14.95*** 15.52*** 15.68*** 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.26) (0.48) (0.49) 
Observations 86,207 86,207 73,776 60,964 48,214 
Within R-squared 0.40 0.23 0.37 0.36 0.31 
The gravity includes      
   ɴij нɴitнɴjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable for specifications (1), (3), (4) and (5) is 
the (natural log of the) real bilateral trade flow; the dependent variable for specification (2) is the (natural log of the) real bilateral trade 
flow from country i to country j divided by the product of their real GDPs. Coefficient estimates of country and time effects are not 
reported for brevity. All regressions include country time and bilateral fixed effects. 
In general, over the 10-year period, the sum of the coefficients of the non-reciprocal PTAs 
found to decrease trade by as much as 24% (e-0.27 -1=-0.24) for non-African member 
countries, while the reciprocal trade agreements increase it by 45% (e0.37 – 1=0.45). For 
African economies, when evaluated over a 10-year period, the non-reciprocal PTAs decrease 
trade by 47% (e-0.63 -1=-0.47), while the reciprocal trade agreements tend to increase it by as 
much as 22% (e0.20- 1=0.22). The result reveals that African reciprocal PTAs increase trade by 
half, lower than that of non-African counterparts, implying that African RTAs are relatively 
less efficient (Table 2). 
2.3.3 Discussion 
This research’s findings show that reciprocal trade agreements increase member countries’ 
exports while non-reciprocal trade agreements decrease them. The non-reciprocal African 
trade agreements tend to have a positive but insignificant effect on exports initially, but their 
impact on trade becomes negative when evaluated over a ten-year period. On the other 
hand, African reciprocal trade agreements increase member export, but only by half in 
comparison to their non-African counterparts. Similarly, African non-reciprocal trade 
agreements also decrease African exports about twice as much as those of their non-African 
counterparts.  
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The negative effect of non-reciprocal PTAs seems puzzling at first glance as the likely 
expectations might be a weaker positive effect instead. There might be a potential 
endogeneity such as non- reciprocal PTA is more likely to be signed among countries that 
trade relatively less in general as a result even if the agreements promote trade in a certain 
sector, its effect may be dominated by the fact that African countries trade less in most of 
the other sectors. Nevertheless, this line of reasoning also strengthens our claim that non- 
reciprocal trade agreements decrease trade as they channels resources to the preference 
receiving sectors and activities and weakening those activities that do not get preferences 
and hence decreasing the overall trade flow.  
The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Direction of Trade database reveals that the share 
of SSA export value in terms of the total world export is a mere 2.4%. Africa’s share in the 
world export market is falling by half of what it was three to four decades ago. Africa’s 
current export share is very low given the continent’s export potential.  The available data 
reveals that in 1948, the export share was 7.3% while the import share was 8.1%. This figure 
drastically dropped to about 3% for exports and 2.5% for imports in 2010.20 Additionally, a 
few resources (including oil, ores, base metals, and gold) account for three quarters of total 
exports from SSA. The failure of the trade policy, the slow growth of economic activities, 
unfavourable geographical factors, and inappropriate transport policies are among the 
explanations that attribute to African trade marginalisation (Carrère, 2004; Amjadi & Yeats, 
1995; Collier, 1995 & Yeats, 1998). 
With regard to non-reciprocal preferences, beyond these obvious rent transfers 
accompanying such preferences, a definite positive impact of these arrangements on 
developing countries is difficult to detect. The non-reciprocal trade preferences may force 
the beneficiary country to shift toward the import-competing sector rather than export 
sectors (Hoekman & Özden, 2005 & Özden & Reinhardt, 2005). Indeed, preferences for one 
set of developing countries have probably come at the expense of other countries. The 
preferences may have also reduced pressures for trade liberalisation within the preferred 
countries, thereby undermining the internal policy reform that could have promoted faster 
expansion of trade and possibly growth (Panagariya, 2002). 
20 The World Bank estimates the annual trade loss equivalent to $70 billion which is roughly 21 percent of GDP and five 
times the $13 billion received in foreign aid (WB, 2000). 
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One possible explanation for a lower export growth following the introduction of non-
reciprocal preferences is the narrow space of preferences thereunder. The utilisation of 
preferences granted to developing countries in the agricultural, food, and fisheries sectors 
are high. Nevertheless, the actual exports are not growing following the introduction of non-
reciprocal preferences. Preferential regimes overlap, making some regimes systematically 
preferable to others, depending on the rules of origin requirement, fixed administrative 
costs, and differences in the preferential margin (Bureau, Chakir & Gallezot, 2006; Bouët, 
Bureau, Decreux & Jean, 2005; Bouët, Decreux, Fontagné, Jean & Laborde, 2008; Manchin, 
2006 & Cadot, De Melo & Portugal-Perez, 2007). For example, the European Union’s (EU’s) 
GSP scheme excluded most agriculture and fishery products while allowing the bulk of raw 
material exports (Clark & Zarrilli, 1992). The protection of the agricultural sector where Africa 
has comparative advantage was more than twelve times greater than manufacturing tariff 
levels (Ingco, 1995 & Gibson, Waino, Whitley & Bohman, 2001).  
Moreover, African countries are increasingly suffering Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) related to 
phytosanitary controls and quality standards and strict rules of origin. In fact, as tariffs are 
reduced within the multilateral framework, nontariff barriers become increasingly important 
(Grant & Lambert, 2008). To protect sensitive products from foreign competition, these 
products are usually either exempted from preferential access, or accessing them demands 
onerous administrative requirements. For example, the GSP is underutilised due to the 
stringent rules of origin and the need to comply to various administrative and technical 
requirements. For the small and undiversified economies of sub-Saharan Africa, excessively 
strict rules of origin can impede the usefulness of preferential agreements (Mold, 2005). 
Some studies indicate that the cost of administrative compliance of non-preferential 
schemes is estimated to be between 1-5% of the value of exports (Candau & Jean, 2005). 
Similarly, Hoekman & Özden (2005) indicate that the administrative hurdles in the form of 
NTBs added to the onerous rules of origin have further limited effective preference 
utilisation, reducing their export value by 3%. In addition, the fact that preferences can be 
revoked by the preference provider on short notice without any right to appeal makes these 
schemes ‘bastion[s] of unregulated protectionism’ (Hoekman & Özden, 2005). 
Chow (1987), Moschos (1989), de Piñeres and Ferrantino (1997), and Giles and Williams’ 
(2000) studies show that export is absolutely essential for countries to foster economic 
20 
 
growth. A possible future research topic is to decompose trade into resources and others, 
and to study the impact of trade reciprocity on exports at commodity level disaggregation. 
2.4 Conclusions 
Africa has a dense web of reciprocal as well as non-reciprocal trade agreements. However, 
despite the proliferation of African trade agreements, the Africa’s share in world export is 
very small and stagnant if not decreasing. Thus, it is important to systematically analyse the 
impact of reciprocal vis-à-vis non-reciprocal trade agreements on African exports. This paper 
attempts to answer the question regarding which type of trade agreements increase African 
exports using a five-year interval gravity panel dataset of 153 countries for the period 1970 
to 2010. It shows that the reciprocal trade agreements tend to increase members’ exports, 
while the non-reciprocal trade agreements decrease exports. These findings are comparable 
to those of Goldstein et al. (2007) and Özden & Reinhardt (2005) regarding the relative effect 
of reciprocal and non-reciprocal trade agreements on African export performance. However, 
it contradicts Gil-Pareja et al.’s (2014) results. The main reason for trade reduction of non-
reciprocal PTAs might be stringent NTBs, like the rules of origin and related restrictions. 
Studies such as Candau & Jean (2005), Hoekman & Özden (2005), Mold (2005), and Grant & 
Lambert (2008) also show that due to NTBs, fewer opportunities are utilised in relation to 
what opportunities are available, although countries mostly tend to use the preference 
granted to export their products. This research also established that both reciprocal and non-
reciprocal trade agreements perform worst in Africa. The result is plausible, given that the 
export share is stagnated at around 10% among African countries over decades. The growth 
fostering potential of reciprocal trade agreements in Africa is almost untapped, and this 
untapped potential could spur growth. According to a World Bank (WB) study, African food 
imports elsewhere have a trade value of up to $52 billion a year.  Broad and deep reciprocal 
trade agreements in Africa have the potential to enable the region to replace its food imports 
from outside of Africa. Moreover, broadening and deepening the reciprocal trade 
agreements can potentially spur the intra-African export of manufacturing products, since 
most African countries are at the same stage of development and share product preferences.  
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 2.5 Annexure 
A1. Exporting Countries in the samples 
34 African plus 115 non-African countries. 
List of African countries:  
Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Congo P.R., Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, 
Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
List of Countries outside Africa:  
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Faeroe Islands, Fiji, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macao-China, 
Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent the Grenadines and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Island, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, UK, USA, Uruguay, 
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen 
A.2 List of Non Preferential Trade agreements 
Table 3: List of Non Preferential Trade agreements 
Name 
 
Provider(s) 
 
Initial Entry 
Into Force 
Generalised System of Preferences - Australia Australia 1/1/1974 
Generalised System of Preferences - Canada Canada 7/1/1974 
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Generalised System of Preferences - EU European Union 7/1/1971 
Generalised System of Preferences - Iceland Iceland 1/29/2002 
Generalised System of Preferences - Japan Japan 8/1/1971 
Generalised System of Preferences - New Zealand New Zealand 1/1/1972 
Generalised System of Preferences - Norway Norway 10/1/1971 
Generalised System of Preferences - Russian 
Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan 
Belarus; Kazakhstan; 
Russian Federation 1/1/2010 
Generalised System of Preferences - Switzerland Switzerland 3/1/1972 
Generalised System of Preferences - Turkey Turkey 1/1/2002 
Generalised System of Preferences - US United States 1/1/1976 
Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme for LDCs India 8/13/2008 
Duty-free treatment for African LDCs - Morocco Morocco 1/1/2001 
Duty-free treatment for LDCs – Chile Chile 2/28/2014 
Duty-free treatment for LDCs - China China 7/1/2010 
Duty-free treatment for LDCs - Chinese Taipei Taipei, Chinese 12/17/2003 
Duty-free treatment for LDCs - Kyrgyz Republic Kyrgyz Republic 3/29/2006 
Preferential Tariff for LDCs -  Republic of Korea Korea, Republic of 1/1/2000 
African Growth and Opportunity Act United States 5/18/2000 
Andean Trade Preference Act United States 12/4/1991 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act United States 1/1/1984 
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff Canada 6/15/1986 
Former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands United States 9/8/1948 
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement 
Australia; New 
Zealand 1/1/1981 
Trade preferences for countries of the Western 
Balkans European Union 12/1/2000 
Trade preferences for Pakistan European Union 11/15/2012 
Trade preferences for the Republic of Moldova European Union 1/21/2008 
 Source: World Trade Organisation - http://ptadb.wto.org/ptaList.aspx 
A.3 Additional Estimations 
The RTA and PTA variables may not be estimated separately, especially with only PTAs (as it 
will misclassify the RTA pairs into the default category). Theoretically the best way to address 
this is drop the country pairs covered by PTAs and keep RTAs only in the regressions and vice 
versa. But given that almost all African countries are recipient of PTAs this option is not 
empirically possible as it will lead to fewer observations to run a meaningful regressions. 
Nevertheless, despite this issue I show the result of separately estimated RTAs and PTAs 
under Table 4 to 7 as part of the stability and consistency check measures of our earlier 
estimations.  The results show that the inferences made are valid and stable. Similar to the 
discussions above, the stability and consistency check measures also affirm that the non-
reciprocal PTAs decrease member countries exports while the reciprocal ones increase them.  
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Table 4: Reciprocal RTA coefficient estimation using various specifications 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ܴܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ 0.42*** 0.56*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
ܴܶܣ_ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ 0.89*** 1.15*** 0.38*** 0.42*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௜௧) 1.06*** 1.09*** 0.88*** 0.96*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௝௧) 0.81*** 0.83*** 0.65*** 0.70*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ܮ݋݃(ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝) -1.16*** -1.16***   
 (0.01) (0.01)   
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݃௜௝ 0.59*** 0.50***   
 (0.04) (0.04)   
ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝ -0.53*** -0.47***   
 (0.02) (0.02)   
ܮܽ݊݃௜௝ 0.78*** 0.79***   
 (0.02) (0.02)   
ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝ 0.85*** 0.88***   
 (0.06) (0.06)   
Constant 5.49*** 5.37*** -0.74*** -2.41*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.28) 
Observations 86,240 86,240 86,240 86,240 
R-squared 0.61 0.62   
Within R-squared   0.24 0.24 
The gravity includes     
   ɴt No Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴij No No Yes Yes 
   ɴt нɴij No No No Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the (natural log of the) real 
bilateral trade flow from country i to country j divided by the product of their real GDPs. 
 
The research estimation results show that the reciprocal African PTAs increase trade by 52% 
(Table 3), while the non-reciprocal PTAs decrease it by as much as 34% (Table 4).  
Table 5: Non reciprocal PTA coefficient estimation using various specifications 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ܲܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ -0.04 0.13*** -0.24*** -0.18*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
ܲܶܣ_ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ -0.16*** -0.07 -0.43*** -0.42*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௜௧) 1.06*** 1.09*** 0.89*** 0.93*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௝௧) 0.82*** 0.83*** 0.68*** 0.70*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ܮ݋݃(ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝) -1.23*** -1.26***   
 (0.01) (0.01)   
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݃௜௝ 0.66*** 0.62***   
 (0.04) (0.05)   
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ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝ -0.52*** -0.47***   
 (0.02) (0.02)   
ܮܽ݊݃௜௝ 0.80*** 0.81***   
 (0.02) (0.02)   
ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝ 0.97*** 1.03***   
Constant 6.05*** 6.06*** -1.15*** -2.01*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.28) 
Observations 86,207 86,207 86,207 86,207 
R-squared 0.61 0.62   
Within R-squared   0.24 0.24 
The gravity includes     
   ɴt No Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴij No No Yes Yes 
   ɴt нɴij No No No Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the (natural log of the) real 
bilateral trade flow from country i to country j divided by the product of their real GDPs. 
However, the estimations under Tables 4 and 5 suffer from omitted variable bias, as they 
neglect the multilateral price terms and changes in terms of trade as a result of trade 
agreements. This concern is addressed in Tables 6 and 7 by incorporating the bilateral, 
exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects, and the lagged effects of PTAs. These time 
varying and time invariant fixed effects drop most of the control variables such as GDPs, 
distance, and other control variables presented in the equation (2.1), except trade 
agreement variables that vary both by country-pair and time. 
Table 6: Reciprocal RTA coefficient estimation with lagged effects 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ܴܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
First Lag   0.15*** 0.12*** 0.23*** 
   (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Second Lag    0.19*** 0.13*** 
    (0.04) (0.05) 
Forward     0.09** 
     (0.04) 
ܴܶܣ_ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.27*** 0.01 0.07 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) 
First Lag   0.31*** 0.27*** 0.37*** 
   (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) 
Second Lag    0.08 0.05 
    (0.09) (0.11) 
Forward     0.10 
     (0.14) 
Constant 14.65*** -6.01*** 14.93*** 15.33*** 15.26*** 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.84) (0.49) 
Observations 86,240 86,240 73,798 60,978 48,228 
Within R-squared 0.40 0.23 0.37 0.36 0.31 
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The gravity includes      
   ɴij нɴitнɴjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable for specifications (1), (3), (4) and (5) is 
the (natural log of the) real bilateral trade flow; the dependent variable for specification (2) is the (natural log of the) real bilateral trade 
flow from country i to country j divided by the product of their real GDPs. Coefficient estimates of country and time effects are not 
reported for brevity. All regressions include country time and bilateral fixed effects. 
The results under Tables 6 and 7 are also consistent with indicating that the non-reciprocal 
African PTAs decrease trade while the reciprocal agreements increase it.  
Table 7: Non reciprocal PTA coefficient estimation with lagged effects 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ܲܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.06 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.0341) (0.06) 
First Lag   -0.15*** -0.0643 -0.08 
   (0.04) (0.0498) (0.06) 
Second Lag    -0.166*** -0.25*** 
    (0.0453) (0.05) 
Forward     -0.23*** 
     (0.04) 
ܲܶܣ_ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ -0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.08 0.16 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) 
First Lag   -0.37*** -0.24** -0.29** 
   (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) 
Second Lag    -0.47*** -0.52*** 
    (0.08) (0.09) 
Forward     -0.22 
     (0.17) 
Constant 14.26*** -6.22*** 15.56*** 15.83*** 15.73*** 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.41) (0.54) (0.47) 
Observations 86,207 86,207 73,776 60,964 48,214 
Within R-squared 0.39 0.23 0.36 0.36 0.31 
The gravity includes      
ɴij нɴitнɴjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable for specifications (1), (3), (4) and (5) is 
the (natural log of the) nominal bilateral trade flow; the dependent variable for specification (2) is the (natural log of the) real bilateral 
trade flow from country i to country j divided by the product of their real GDPs. Coefficient estimates of country and time effects are not 
reported for brevity. All regressions include country time and bilateral fixed effects. 
The reciprocal trade agreements increase African exports by as much as 31%. However, the 
non-reciprocal agreements have a negative and significant impact on trade that decrease 
exports by as much as 51% over a ten-year period (Tables 6 and 7). 
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III. An Empirical Analysis of African Regional Economic 
Communities 
3.1 Introduction 
Africa is a continent that is composed of countries with different levels of economic 
development, population size, and economic performance. The continent is also 
characterised by fragmented markets.21 This fragmented market condition means that Sub 
Saharan African (SSA) countries have significant potential to benefit from a strong and 
efficient regional economic community that enables them to trade between themselves.22 
Nevertheless, regional economic communities in Africa are insubstantial and are not 
effectively utilised, especially in comparison to regional trade agreements elsewhere. Trade 
within Africa is generally extremely limited and sporadic.  
The region is at the periphery of the global economy, as is evident in the region’s declining 
share in global production and trade.23 The IMF’s direction of trade (DOT) dataset shows that 
only about 10 to 12% of SSA trade takes place between SSA countries. In other words, more 
than 80% of the region’s exports are destined for countries outside of Africa.  Similarly, more 
than 90% of the imports are from outside the continent, even though it has a huge potential 
to satisfy its own import needs. Trade among SSA countries accounts for only 12% of total 
exports.24  
Recently, over the past two decades, the trade share of EU and US with SSA countries is 
falling rapidly, while the trade share of emerging markets (including China, Brazil and India) 
with SSA countries is rapidly increasing. For example, in 2012, the total exports of SSA 
21 In 2012, the WB dataset shows that out of the total 47 SSA countries, 11 countries had populations of less than 2 million. 
In the same year, 18 countries had a GDP of less than US$5 billion, of which four had a GDP of less than 1 billion USD. Out 
of the total 47 countries in SSA, 15 countries are also landlocked that for obvious reasons remarkably increases trade 
transaction costs. 
 
22 This chapter concerns the effects of African regional economic communities (REC) rather than Africa’s Free Trade Areas 
(FTAs) on its exports because an REC generally includes FTA, but also other forms of economic integration, such as 
economic union, custom union, etc.  
 
23 It has been argued that the African integration initiatives have been driven more by political motives than a true desire 
to foster trade and economic growth.  As a result, Africa is not benefiting from internal trade as do their Asian and Latin 
American developing counterparts. 
24 The biggest export destination of SSA is the EU as it is the destination for approximately 24% of the total SSA export. 
Region wise, SSA exports roughly 41% of its export commodities to advanced economies. Developing Asia is the destination 
of roughly 27% of the region total commodity export.  Resources (including oil, ore, base metals, and gold) account for 
three quarters of total exports from SSA. 
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countries to China, Brazil, and India were larger than to the EU. Similarly, in the same year, 
the share of SSA countries’ exports to China exceeded SSA countries’ exports to USA, 
implying the growing importance of China in SSA international trade relations. However, the 
intra-regional trade share stagnates and remains the same (Fig 2 and Table 14 -15; and Fig 
3-6).  
Figure 2: Intra-REC average export share in percent for 2000 – 2009
Source: IMF DOTS Database 
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It is my argument that regional integration and cooperation are the most relevant way to 
enhance weak intra-African trade because it enables these countries to gain economies of 
scale associated with expanded trade and overall economic growth.25  
Taking this into account, I systematically analysed the impact of regional trade blocks on 
intra-African countries’ export. Specifically, this research sought to establish which trade 
blocks increase export by using a gravity model on a five-year interval panel dataset of 153 
exporting countries for the period 1970 to 2010. The research explicitly addresses the issue 
of endogeneity due to omitted variable bias by including bilateral pair, exporter-year and 
importer- year fixed effects (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007 & Gil-Pareja et al., 2014), and my latest 
dataset includes trade data from recent years.  
I find that while the ECOWAS and ECCAS trade blocks increase trade by as much as 250% and 
150% respectively, CENSAD, SADC, COMESA, and EAC increase trade for their members only 
by between 30 to 90%. Given the importance of regional trade agreements in member 
countries’ export flow, this study’s result reveals that deepening and widening of regional 
trade agreements is essential for sustainable future export growth of Africa. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of trade in SSA while 
section 3.3 deals with the research study’s data and methods. Section 3.4 presents an 
analysis of the main findings, and section 3.5 presents the conclusions. 
3.2 A Brief Overview of Trade in Africa  
Despite the recent relatively robust growth in SSA (IMF, 2013), the poverty remains 
ubiquitous, and as a result the region lags behind the world in economic growth and 
development.26 The debate over the quality of growth and its sustainability still continues. 
Trade has a huge potential for growth and development in Africa.27 Consequently, 
25 Intra-African trade and investment can fuel competitiveness and growth in the region by creating strong backward and 
forward linkages within the economy. African countries import agricultural products from global markets instead of from 
the countries within. African farmers produce only  % of Africa’s cereal imports (WB, 2012a), revealing the huge untapped 
potential for growth of African agriculture through trade.  
 
26 A sustainable and substantial increase in real per capita GDP growth rates and improvements in social conditions are 
needed to address the economic misfortune of the SSA. 
 
27 Africa has a heterogeneous group of countries that are in different economic development stages. The countries include 
failed states, coastal and landlocked resource scarce countries, resource rich countries and countries with less favourable 
agricultural potentials (MCKay & Thorbecke, 2015).  
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strengthening the region’s trade ties with the rest of the world to spur growth is essential. 
Africa has many trade agreements.28 Many countries in the region are members of more 
than two RTAs. The complex web of overlapping RTA membership has created 
implementation problems for the countries involved.29 The main reason for the proliferation 
of RTAs in Africa can be attributed mainly to the desire of African countries to establish FTAs 
or custom unions within sub-regions in order to increase trade and attract foreign direct 
investment. However, there has not been much of an increase in intra-Africa trade relative 
to trade with the rest of the world. In fact, Africa is characterised by a low level of 
interregional trade.  
RTAs within Africa are insubstantial and constitute a relatively small portion of the region’s 
overall trade with the world. African countries’ trade links with the rest of the world are 
characterised by significant marginalisation that constitutes less than 2% of the world 
exports. Additionally, African export destinations are highly concentrated to a few EU 
countries and the USA, although recently trade links are growing with Asian emerging 
economies such as China and India. In addition, African countries’ exports remain confined 
to a few agricultural products such as coffee, cacao, cotton, hide and skin, and horticultural 
crops.30 For example, only 10 products account for roughly 60% of export value in the case 
of the EU’s Asian, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) preferences (Panagariya, 2002). Despite lower 
utilisation, the market potential of African regional blocks is shown in Table 8 hereunder. 
 
 
 
 
28 Cognisant the importance of trade for development; USA, EU, China, India and other countries encourage developing 
countries to access their market open to SSA countries through preferential trade agreements (PTAs).  Generalised System 
of Preferences (GSP) and Asian, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) are PTA agreements offered to Least Developing Countries 
(LDCs) decades ago. SSA poor countries also recently benefit from everything but arms (EBA) program of EU and African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of US PTA Schemes. Lately; Duty Free, Quota Free (DFQF) arrangement with emerging 
Asian countries is also available for Sub Saharan Africa countries. Moreover, Regional Trade Arrangements (RTAs) are also 
getting more focus in SSA now.   
 
29 Advanced countries as well as emerging economies are providing a duty free market access for African producers on 
the hope that trade will spur economic growth in the region. Regional integrations are also getting more attention in the 
region although some times the motive is mainly political than economic. However; detailed analysis of PTAs and their 
impacts on SSA economies is also missing although there are plethora of PTAs in the region. It is therefore pertinent and 
topical to study trade in SSA in detail where some critical studies are often times missing for informed policy making. 
30 Agricultural export for some countries accounts as high as 50% of their total exports. For non-agricultural exports, raw 
material exports like oil, metal and minerals are the dominant. 
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Table 8: Market Potential of African Economic Communities in 2010 
Regional Economic 
Communities (REC) 
Area (km²) 
 
Population (in 
Million) 
GDP ( in 
million $US) 
GDP per 
capita 
Number of 
Member states 
AEC 29,910,442 1042 1,945,000 2507.41 54 
ECOWAS 5,112,903 304.4 485,200 954.4 15 
ECCAS 6,667,421 150.4 187,200 3,486.03 11 
SADC 9,882,959 280.4 605,100 3,311.67 15 
EAC 1,817,945 138.9 99,310 615.4 5 
COMESA 12,873,957 433.4 533,800 2,526.95 20 
IGAD 5,233,604 222.3 174,700 962.55 8 
Source: WB WDI Database 
The depth of integration is not uniform across the different trading blocks. Some trade blocks 
already form FTAs and CUs while others are still working towards this. In some of the trade 
blocks not all member countries are participating in signing the FTA and CU trade agreements 
(Table 9). 
Table 9: The level of depth of Integration of various RECs in African 
Economic 
Integration 
Free Trade 
Area 
Customs 
Union 
Comment 
AEC Proposed Proposed for 2019 
CEN-SAD stalled stalled   
COMESA progressing  proposed About 6 member countries not yet 
participating 
EAC fully in force fully in force  
ECCAS proposed proposed  Both FTA and CU are fully inforce for 
CEMAC members 
ECOWAS proposed proposed Both FTA and CU are fully inforce for 
UEMOA members 
SADC progressing proposed Both FTA and CU are fully inforce for 
SACU members and 3 Member 
countries not yet participating 
 
The potential contribution of trade for SSA’s economic growth and development has recently 
been debated among academics and policy makers. Studies show that outward-oriented 
trade policies are conducive to faster economic growth because they promote competition, 
encourage learning by doing, improve access to trade opportunities, and raise the efficiency 
of resource allocation. Regional integration and access to preferential trade areas allow 
many countries to withstand the obstacles posed by the small domestic market sizes to 
realise greater economies of scale and to increase their ability to trade on a global basis.  
Prominent African development scholars strongly emphasise the ineffectiveness of aid, and 
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instead prescribe market-based policies like trade and investment. For example, Moyo 
(2009) strongly recommends market-based policies for African sustainable growth and 
development, which includes trade.31 It has been argued that foreign aid is ineffective in 
bringing long-term growth to SSA. Trade and other market-based financial tools impact 
greatly in fostering economic growth in SSA. 
Moreover, the globalisation of world economies has presented opportunities and challenges 
for many African countries. SSA countries are becoming more open and they attempt to reap 
as much benefit as they can from preferential schemes they are entitled to.  Nevertheless, 
natural resource exports dominate the SSA trade, and this dependence on primary 
commodity exports is insufficient for a sustained, long-term growth needed to enrich the 
region. The major challenge for many African countries in using trade as a tool for reducing 
poverty is the lack of understanding regarding trade’s impact on growth by policy-makers, 
and their inability to negotiate development-friendly trade rules in the WTO and other 
bilateral and multilateral partner countries.  
SSA trade is constrained by various factors such as the lack of complementary products, high 
external trade barriers, lower level of competitiveness in African member countries, 
institutional bottlenecks, and governments’ unwillingness to surrender the sovereignty of 
their macroeconomic policies. Moreover, the lack of strong and sustained political 
commitment and governments’ unwillingness to accept unequal distribution of gains and 
losses arising from RTAs also bottlenecked trade growth in Africa (Lyakurwa, McKay, Ng’eno 
& Kennes, 1997 & McCarthy, 2007).  
A number of studies reveal the importance of regional trade agreements on member 
countries’ exports (Tang, 2005; Baldwin, 1994 & Sarker & Jayasinghe, 2007). Sound trade 
agreements have the potential to bring substantial economic gains to Africa, enabling the 
continent to export more diversified and more processed agricultural and industrial exports 
within the region and the rest of the world.  There are a number of studies that investigate 
SSA’s RECs impact on members’ exports. Some studies found that COMESA, ECCAS, and 
ECOWAS trade agreements in Africa do not have any considerable trade diversion and 
31 According to Moyo (2009), the only way to break the poverty trap in Africa is by ending state aid and introducing market-
based financial tools such as government bonds and microfinance, and foreign direct investment and trade. 
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creation impacts due to the lack of trade complementarity between member countries 
(Mayda & Steinberg, 2009; Carrère, 2004;  Musila, 2005 & Rojid,  2006).  
This study analysed the effects of all regional trade agreements on the intra-SSA trade. This 
study adds value to the existing literature because it rigorously analyses the impact of the 
African trade blocs on their members’ exports using recent econometric methods that fully 
address the problem of endogeneity due to omitted variables bias.  
3.3 Data and Method 
3.3.1 Data 
The data used in this paper consists of a five-year interval panel dataset of 153 countries for 
the period 1970 to 2010. The trade data is sourced from the United Nations Commodity 
Trade Database (UN COMTRADE) database, while the GDP data is derived from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI). The data on the distance and other control variables is 
sourced from CEPII databases, while the data for RECs is from my compilation. Since the 
focus of this chapter is the impact of regional trade agreements on the intensive margin of 
African countries’ exports, the sample consists only of nonzero trade flows. Zero trade 
values, if included, account approximately for 20% of the observations.32 
3.3.2 Estimation Method 
This research used a gravity model with bilateral pair, exporter-year and importer-year fixed 
effects in order to resolve the issue of endogeneity due to omitted variable bias. Since the 
determinants of the presence and absence of trade agreements, such as GDPs and the extent 
of domestic regulations, also tend to explain trade flows between countries the presence or 
absence of trade agreements is endogenous. Hence, if left uncorrected, this endogeneity 
may overestimate or underestimate the coefficients of interest. Theoretically, omitted 
32 Although the method of dealing with the issue of zero trade flows is presented in Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) and 
Felbermyer and Kohler’s (2006) studies, this research excludes zero trade flows from the sample, and instead follows Baier 
& Berstrand’s (2007) recommendations, since the issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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variables, simultaneity,33 and measurement errors34 can cause endogeneity. However, 
studies justify that the most important source of endogeneity in the gravity study of effect 
of trade agreements on trade is the omitted variable (and selection) bias (Baier & Bergstrand, 
2004; 2007 & Egger, 2004). 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) clarify that the omitted variable bias arises from 
disregarding multi-lateral trade resistance terms that capture the idea that trade choices are 
established on relative rather than absolute prices. In a panel setting, the presence of 
country-pair and country-year dummies can be employed to treat endogeneity arising from 
the omission of multilateral trade resistance terms (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007 & Gil-Pareja 
et. al., 2014). 
Despite the fact that OLS estimations provide biased and inconsistent estimates, I started 
analysing the results from the OLS estimation and with and without time dummies as a 
baseline for comparison. Specifically, the baseline OLS specification is represented by 
equation (3.1) below: 35 
ܮ݋݃൫ܧݔ݌௜௝௧൯ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܮ݋݃(ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧) + ߚଶܮ݋݃൫ܩܦ ௝ܲ௧൯+ ߚଷܮ݋݃൫ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝൯ + ߚସܥ݋݊ݐ݅݃௜௝
+ ߚହܮܽ݊݃௜௝ + ߚ଺ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝௧ + ߚ଻ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝ + ߚ଼SADC௜௝௧
+ ߚଽECCAS௜௝௧ + ߚଵ଴ܧܣܥ௜௝௧ + ߚଵଵܧܥܱܹܣ ௜ܵ௝௧ + ߚଵଶܥܱܯܧܵܣ௜௝௧
+ ߚଵଷܥܧܰܵܣܦ௜௝௧ +  ߚଵସ ܴܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݆݅ܿܽ݅ݐ + ߝ௜௝௧ଵ  
(3.1) 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
Log (Expijt): the log of country i export to country j at time t. 
Log (GDPit) and Log (GDPjt): the GDP of country i and country j at time t respectively. 
33 The possibility of simultaneity bias is argued to be insignificant. The growth literature reveals that GDP is theoretically 
endogenous to bilateral trade flows. However, some definite explanations exist for generally disregarding potential 
endogeneity of GDP and exports.  Firstly, GDP is a function of net multilateral exports, which on average tends to be less 
than 5% of a country's GDP and its connection to gross exports is much less direct. Secondly, the gravity equation relates 
bilateral trade flows to countries' GDPs, which are a very small share of country's multilateral exports. Thirdly, previous 
studies indicate that the potential endogeneity of GDPs with export is insignificant (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). 
 
34 The best method to remove measurement error bias is creation of a continuous variable that would more precisely 
measure the extent of trade liberalisation from various trade agreements. If the trade agreements only remove the bilateral 
tariff alone, one could quantify them using the change in the tariff rates. However, in practice, trade agreements go beyond 
tariff reduction, as they may develop into internal regulations and other NTBs.  The calculation of such measures is beyond 
the scope of this chapter and is a useful future research direction. This research adheres to the 0-1 measures that have 
been used over the last four decades (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). 
 
35 This essay only focuses on the double membership but not the triple or higher dimension of regional trading blocs. 
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Log (Distij): the log of distance between the trading pairs. 
Contigij: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs share common borders. 
Langij: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs have a common language. 
Currencyijt: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs have common currency. 
Landlockedij: a dummy variable on whether either the exporter or the importer or both are 
landlocked countries. 
SADCijt: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs are SADC members.   
ECCASijt: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs are ECCAS members. 
EACijt: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs are EAC members.   
ECOWASijt: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs are ECOWAS members. 
COMESAijt: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs are COMESA members.  
CENSADijt: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs are CENSAD members. 
ܴܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs are Non-African countries 
and have reciprocal trade agreements.   
The specifications given under equation (3.2) incorporate bilateral (ߚ௜௝), exporter- year (ߚ௜௧) 
and importer-year (ߚ௜௧), and fixed effects, and hence take care of all time-invariant and time-
varying fixed effects.  These time-varying and time-invariant fixed effects replace most of the 
control variables, such as GDPs, distance, and other control variables presented in the 
equation (3.1) except trade agreement variables that vary both by country-pair and time.  
ܮ݋݃൫ܧݔ݌௜௝௧൯ = ߚ଴ + ߚ௜௝ + ߚ௜௧ + ߚ௝௧ + ߚଵܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝௧+ ߚଶSADC௜௝௧ + ߚଷECCAS௜௝௧
+ ߚସܧܣܥ௜௝௧ + ߚହܧܥܱܹܣ ௜ܵ௝௧ + ߚ଺ܥܱܯܧܵܣ௜௝௧ + ߚ଻ܥܧܰܵܣܦ௜௝௧
+  ߚ଼ ܴܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ + ߝ௜௝௧ଶ  
(3.2) 
Equation (3.2) is my preferred specification and consequently the focus is to interpret the 
results obtained based on it. It is important to note that African RECs are characterised by 
overlapping membership.36 In order to control for the overlapping membership I include a 
new variable (REC_MultiMemijt) that assumes a value of 1 if the trading pairs has more than 
one REC membership, and 0 otherwise. The need to control for overlapping membership is 
36 Normally, if any two RTAs differ significantly in what countries their members are, the overlapping membership in more 
than one RTA is not a major problem, since there are still some variations there. However, if two RTAs do not differ much 
in terms of their members, there is a potential problem in terms of the standard error of the estimates. 
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explained by the fact that being a member of a REC such as EAC, ECOWAS, COMESA…etc. 
clearly influences the likelihood of an African country to join the second REC, the third 
REC…etc. and that both single membership or multiple membership impact the bilateral 
exports. In other words, the variables of interest, namely SADC, ECCAS, EAC, ECOWAS, and 
CENSAD may correlate with the variable REC_Mult_Memijt. As a result it might be justifiable 
to control for REC_Mult_Memijt in order to see if it has any effect of the sign and coefficient 
estimation of the REC variables (Afesorgbor & Van Bergeijk, 2011). The gravity specification 
that controls for multiple membership is presented under equation (3.3) below. 
ܮ݋݃൫ܧݔ݌௜௝௧൯ = ߚ଴ + ߚ௜௝ + ߚ௜௧ + ߚ௝௧ + ߚଵܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝௧+ ߚଶSADC௜௝௧ + ߚଷECCAS௜௝௧
+ ߚସܧܣܥ௜௝௧ + ߚହܧܥܱܹܣ ௜ܵ௝௧ + ߚ଺ܥܱܯܧܵܣ௜௝௧ + ߚ଻ܥܧܰܵܣܦ௜௝௧
+  ߚ଼ ܴܧܥ_ܯݑ݈ݐ_Mem௜௝௧  +  ߚଽ ܴܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ + ߝ௜௝௧ଷ  
(3.3) 
3.4 Analysis 
3.4.1 Results 
In line with previous literature, the result of regressions shows that the log of both origin and 
destination countries’ GDPs has positive and significant effects on Africa’s intra-regional 
exports. Distance has a negative and significant effect on trade while contiguity, common 
language, and common currency have positive and significant effects as expected.  
The estimations presented under columns (1)-(4) suffer the problem of omitted variable bias 
since they fail to take into consideration multilateral trade resistance terms. The results in 
column (5) corresponds to the preferred gravity specification (3.2). Note that this 
specification takes into consideration the issue of endogeneity that might arise due to the 
neglect of multilateral price terms. As a result, the subsequent discussion of the results 
focuses mainly on those in column 5. The regional African trading bloc that increases 
members’ exports the most is ECOWAS. The result reveals that ECOWAS increases its 
members’ trade by as much as 245% (e1.24 - 1 = 2.45).  SADC increases its members’ exports 
by 85%, while ECCAS increases its members exports by 150%.  COMESA and CENSAD increase 
their members’ exports by 30 and 25% respectively.  This research’s results show that the 
EAC has a positive yet insignificant impact on its members’ exports. The EAC’s positive 
coefficient sign implies that it could potentially increase its members’ exports by as much as 
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80% (Table 10). However, the EAC is found to significantly and positively increase its 
members export when the issue of multiple membership is considered (Table 11 and 12).  
The result reveals that trade blocs increase their member countries’ exports, especially those 
with a higher level of integration. ECOWAS and ECCAS have some members who form 
customs and monetary unions. CENSAD members are not as deeply integrated as others.   
Table 10: RECs gravity equation coefficient using various specifications 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the (natural log of the) real bilateral 
trade flow from country i to country j. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SADC௜௝௧ 1.43*** 1.62*** 0.41* 0.44** 0.61*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) 
ECCAS௜௝௧ -0.01 0.31 0.58* 0.65** 0.91*** 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) 
ܧܣܥ௜௝௧ 2.04*** 2.50*** 0.57 0.65* 0.60 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) 
ܧܥܱܹܣ ௜ܵ௝௧ 1.12*** 1.20*** 1.06*** 1.14*** 1.24*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) 
ܥܱܯܧܵܣ௜௝௧ 0.56*** 0.79*** 0.18 0.20 0.28** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
ܥܧܰܵܣܦ௜௝௧ -0.75*** -0.32** -0.11 -0.05 0.24** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
ܴܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ 0.43*** 0.57*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.22*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௜௧) 1.06*** 1.09*** 0.88*** 0.96***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௝௧) 0.81*** 0.83*** 0.65*** 0.70***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
ܮ݋݃(ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝) -1.16*** -1.15***    
 (0.01) (0.01)    
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݃௜௝ 0.56*** 0.47***    
 (0.04) (0.04)    
ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝ -0.53*** -0.48***    
 (0.02) (0.02)    
ܮܽ݊݃௜௝ 0.78*** 0.79***    
 (0.02) (0.02)    
ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝௧ 0.88*** 0.89***    
 (0.07) (0.07)    
Constant 5.45*** 5.34*** -0.74*** -2.51*** 16.74*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.28) (0.01) 
Observations 86,240 86,240 86,240 86,240 86,240 
R-squared 0.61 0.62    
Within R-squared   0.24 0.24 0.40 
The gravity includes      
   ɴt No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴij No No Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴt нɴij No No No Yes Yes 
   ɴij нɴitнɴjt No No No No Yes 
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Multiple membership is common in all African trade blocs. As a result I investigated its effect 
on members’ export in terms of stability and consistency. Results show that all RECs increase 
exports, and interestingly, the EAC is the most trade-inducing regional bloc of all, increasing 
trade amongst its trading members by 250%. The result also shows that the multiple 
membership variable also increases trade, revealing that trade in most African regional trade 
agreements are dominated by only few countries (Table 11).  
 Table 11: Gravity equation coefficient of RECS accounting for multiple membership 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SADC௜௝௧ 1.59*** 1.89*** 0.66*** 0.72*** 0.74*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) 
ECCAS௜௝௧ -0.01 0.33 0.87*** 0.94*** 1.18*** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.31) (0.31) (0.30) 
ܧܣܥ௜௝௧ 2.03*** 2.60*** 1.20** 1.28** 1.25** 
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.57) (0.57) (0.53) 
ܧܥܱܹܣ ௜ܵ௝௧ 0.90*** 0.99*** 0.73*** 0.79*** 0.93*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
ܥܱܯܧܵܣ௜௝௧ 0.59*** 0.86*** 0.33** 0.35*** 0.40*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
ܥܧܰܵܣܦ௜௝௧ -1.37*** -0.90*** -0.33** -0.25* 0.29* 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
ܴܧܥ_ܯݑ݈ݐ_Mem௜௝௧ 1.20*** 1.64*** 0.74*** 0.84*** 1.07*** 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
ܴܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ 0.43*** 0.57*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.22*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௜௧) 1.05*** 1.09*** 0.88*** 0.96***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௝௧) 0.81*** 0.83*** 0.65*** 0.70***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
ܮ݋݃(ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝) -1.16*** -1.15***    
 (0.01) (0.01)    
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݃௜௝ 0.56*** 0.47***    
 (0.04) (0.04)    
ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝ -0.53*** -0.48***    
 (0.02) (0.02)    
ܮܽ݊݃௜௝ 0.78*** 0.79***    
 (0.02) (0.02)    
ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝௧ 0.85*** 0.86***    
 (0.06) (0.06)    
Constant 5.47*** 5.35*** -0.74*** -2.51*** 16.74*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.28) (0.01) 
Observations 86,240 86,240 86,240 86,240 86,240 
R-squared 0.61 0.62    
Within R-squared    0.24 0.24 0.40 
The gravity includes      
   ɴt No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴij No No Yes Yes Yes 
38 
 
   ɴt нɴij No No No Yes Yes 
   ɴij нɴitнɴjt No No No No Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the (natural log of the) real bilateral 
trade flow from country i to country j. 
Although variable REC_Mult_Memijt is an ad hoc, I include this specification to partially and 
indirectly answer some concerns related to the effect of triple or higher multiple REC 
memberships on the effectiveness of the trading blocks. As a result, I also ran regressions, 
including variables of specific multiple membership RECs, to see if the results discussed 
above changed and therefore the inference. However, the results are similar to the previous 
results, except that the magnitude of the coefficient is relatively higher, and all the REC 
coefficients are statistically significant when multiple membership is considered. The biggest 
export increasing trade bloc is ECOWAS, which increases trade among members by as much 
as 240%. EAC is also found to increase trade amongst its member by 225%. ECCAS increases 
trade among its members by 190%, while SADC increases trade among its members by 90%. 
CENSAD and COMESA increase their members’ exports by 30% and 40% respectively (Table 
12). 
Table 12: Gravity coefficient of RECS accounting for multiple membership revisited 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SADC௜௝௧ 1.59*** 1.89*** 0.54** 0.57** 0.63** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) 
ECCAS௜௝௧ -0.02 0.31 0.79** 0.86*** 1.07*** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.31) (0.31) (0.30) 
ܧܣܥ௜௝௧ 2.03*** 2.59*** 1.17** 1.24** 1.18** 
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.57) (0.57) (0.53) 
ܧܥܱܹܣ ௜ܵ௝௧ 0.89*** 0.98*** 0.97*** 1.05*** 1.23*** 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) 
ܥܱܯܧܵܣ௜௝௧ 0.59*** 0.86*** 0.27* 0.29** 0.32** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
ܥܧܰܵܣܦ௜௝௧ -1.38*** -0.90*** -0.32** -0.24 0.28* 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
SADC_COMESA௜௝௧ 1.85*** 2.16*** 0.54** 0.59*** 0.90*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
ECCAS_COMESA௜௝௧ 1.06* 1.48** 1.69 1.90 2.62* 
 (0.56) (0.61) (1.63) (1.63) (1.54) 
ܧܥܥܣܵ_CENSAD௜௝௧ -1.16* -0.74 -3.71*** -3.65*** -2.65** 
 (0.69) (0.77) (1.12) (1.12) (1.06) 
ܧܣܥ_ܥܱܯܧܵܣ௜௝௧ 2.60*** 3.18*** 0.36 0.46 0.42 
 (0.35) (0.34) (0.53) (0.53) (0.51) 
ܧܥܱܹܣܵ_ܥܧܰܵܣܦ௜௝௧ 0.83*** 1.31*** 1.12*** 1.25*** 1.52*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) 
ܥܱܯܧܵܣ_ܥܧܰܵܣܦ௜௝௧ 0.43 1.02 -1.11 -1.02 -0.16 
 (1.94) (1.92) (0.72) (0.72) (0.67) 
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ܴܶܣ_ܰ݋݊ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ௜௝௧ 0.43*** 0.57*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.22*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௜௧) 1.06*** 1.09*** 0.88*** 0.97***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௝௧) 0.81*** 0.83*** 0.65*** 0.70***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
ܮ݋݃(ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝) -1.16*** -1.15***    
 (0.01) (0.01)    
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݃௜௝ 0.56*** 0.47***    
 (0.04) (0.04)    
ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝ -0.53*** -0.48***    
 (0.02) (0.02)    
ܮܽ݊݃௜௝ 0.78*** 0.79***    
 (0.02) (0.02)    
ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝௧ 0.89*** 0.89***    
 (0.07) (0.07)    
Constant 5.47*** 5.35*** -0.74*** -2.53*** 16.74*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.28) (0.01) 
Observations 86,240 86,240 86,240 86,240 86,240 
R-squared 0.61 0.62    
Within R-squared   0.24 0.24 0.4 
The gravity includes      
   ɴt No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴij No No Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴt нɴij No No No Yes Yes 
   ɴij нɴitнɴjt No No No No Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the (natural log of the) real bilateral 
trade flow from country i to country j.  SADC_COMESA௜௝௧ takes the value of 1 if the pair countries are both belong to the SADC and 
COMESA simultaneously. Other combinations are also defined in the same fashion. 
The coefficient estimates of member countries that have multiple membership with multiple 
RECs reveals ambiguous effects of multiple membership on members’ export flows. The 
ECCAS-COMESA dual membership increases trade the most followed by the ECCAS-CENSAD 
dual membership. Similarly, the SADC-COMESA and ECOWAS-CENSAD multiple membership 
increases exports. The EAC-COMESA membership has a positive but insignificant coefficient 
estimate, while the COMESA-CENSAD dual membership has negative but insignificant 
coefficient estimates. In conclusion, the results reveal that multiple membership’s effect on 
trade is ambiguous (Table 12).  
3.4.2 Discussion 
This research shows that coefficients relating intra-regional trade are significantly positive 
for all the regional economic communities. In other words all African economic communities 
are trade-creating. This research’s findings support some of previous studies’ results. For 
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example, although Carrère’s (2004) study didn’t account for time varying effects, it 
established that the African regional trade agreements have generated a significant increase 
in trade between members. Similarly, Musila (2005) found that the intensity of trade 
creation is higher in the ECOWAS followed by COMESA, while the ECCAS’s effect was 
statistically insignificant. In addition, Rojid (2006) found that COMESA is a building block in 
the sense that it created more trade within than it diverted from the rest of the world.37 
Furthermore, as a whole, the multiple membership dummy is found to be significantly 
positive, while the result of disaggregated multiple memberships is ambiguous. This implies 
that it is better for African countries to form broader RECs by merging existing RECs together. 
In this regard, the COMESA-SADC-EAC tripartite FTA initiative is commendable.  
However, despite the trade-creation effect of the African RECs, the actual trade flow within 
intra-Africa is very limited. Justification for these seemingly paradoxical results can be 
explained via looking into the form of RECs in Africa which is shown under Table 9. The 
information in the table reveals that some RECs in Africa are deeper while in others only part 
of the member countries form a deeper integration whereas the remaining countries are 
mostly inactive members. Yet, there are also some blocks in which the members’ attempt of 
forming a deeper form of integration is stalled (Table 9). 
Broader and deeper regional integration is critical for SSA to diversify the economy and spur 
growth.38 Strengthening RECs in SSA would put many of its members in more direct 
competition with each other and with the rest of the world, and would also create an 
environment that is conducive to attracting foreign investment.   
There is significant trade potential between intra-Africa countries since most African 
countries are highly dependent on trade.39 However, the low level of significant integration, 
frequent conflicts, political tensions, and violence significantly diminish African countries’ 
capacity for their trade blocs to engage in strong intra-bloc trade. In addition, trade pattern 
37 However, as these studies do not take time varying effects into account, this research did not consider the magnitude 
of the results to be useful. 
 
38 The EU’s GDP per capita would be approximately one fifth lower than today had no integration taken place since 1950 
(Badinger, 2005). 
 
39 The trade to GDP ratio is on average roughly about 67% which goes to as high as above 150% for example in the case of 
Lesotho. 
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similarity significantly decreases SSA’s potential intra-regional trade. Studies show that 
transport and communication infrastructure, product diversification, tariffs and custom 
issues, domestic trade, and regulatory policies are the main impediments for the low level 
of trade within Africa. In addition, the inefficient border administration decreases the 
competitiveness of African exports in global markets (Yeats, 1998; Longo & Sekkat, 2004 & 
Foroutan & Pritchett, 1993).  
Currently, the intra-regional trade within Africa stands at 10%, while it stands at 69% with 
the EU, 49% with Asia, and 40% with Latin America, revealing that the development of 
regional trade agreements in Africa lags far behind other world regions. This implies that 
efficient regional communities can help African countries to reap the benefits of the 
potential intra-African trade where African countries have a relatively higher comparative 
advantage.  
There are several agricultural and lower-end industrial goods that are produced in Africa and 
imported from the rest of the world. In spite of the fact that most African countries have a 
comparative advantage in the production and export of these goods among themselves, 
Africa remains a major importer of food and lower-end industrial products from the rest of 
the world.  Most African countries are highly dependent on imports for their consumption. 
The heavy reliance on foreign exchange earnings and tax revenue from foreign trade taxes 
also lowers African countries’ incentive to form deeper regional integration (Fig 8).40   
In addition to the lower export and import flow in each trade bloc where the most 
industrialised countries of the group (usually the country with the highest customs tariffs or 
sometimes the only producing country) are the ‘dominant’ countries in African trade blocs, 
the intra-REC trade in each REC is dominated by one or a few countries as major exporters.41 
The African intra-REC export situation is also prevalent in the African intra-REC imports. A 
40 Governments in Africa heavily rely on tax revenue generated from international trade because they have difficulty raising 
taxes from other sources since their tax base is narrow. For example, taking the average value for 1995-2005, SSA countries 
such as Lesotho and Swaziland generate a tax revenue as high as 50% from international trade, while the regional average 
is 30%. This is significantly high compared to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which 
is 0.8%. As a result, they are reluctant to reduce their import tariffs to integrate with the rest of the world. 
 
41 For example, about 73% of exports in the EAC came from Kenya, while in ECCAS about 64% of exports came from 
Cameroon. Similarly, in ECOWAS, about 77% of exports came from Nigeria (45%) and Côte d’Ivoire (32%), while in SADC 
roughly more than 60% of exports originate from South Africa. The same applies to COMESA since roughly 67% of exports 
are from Kenya (27%), Egypt (18%), and 10% from Uganda and Zambia (IMF DOT, 2013). 
 
42 
 
                                                          
significant portion of intra-REC imports for each REC is dominated by a few countries.42 All 
this limits trade flows to Africa despite the apparently significant potential to engaging in 
more trade with each other. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Regional trade agreements are essential to enhance trade between African countries and to 
stimulate economic growth. The intra-regional trade share in Africa is very small. The data 
reveals that more than 80% of African exports and 90% of African imports are to and from 
countries outside of Africa. This chapter investigates the trade creation effects of the African 
RECs using a five-year interval gravity panel dataset of 153 countries for the period 1970 to 
2010. The research established that African trade blocs are important in increasing their 
members exports, albeit with varying degree of effectiveness.  African regional trade 
agreements have positive and significant impacts on intra-African exports. Nevertheless, the 
resultant trade flow relative to the total African export to the world is very small. Africa has 
the potential to cover its food needs through intra-African trade, but at the moment Africa 
is importing 95% of its food needs from elsewhere. As the WB study indicates, this is a loss 
of more than $52 billion a year in trade in values that Africa could potentially retain within 
its borders. This reveals that Africa is the only region on earth that lags behind in creating 
broad regional trading blocs. As such, the growth-fostering potential of trade blocs in Africa 
is almost untapped. The creation of wider and deeper efficient regional trading blocs can 
significantly spur African growth.  Regional trade blocs are crucial elsewhere in promoting 
export and fostering economic growth and prosperity. For example, some studies indicate 
that had EU not integrated five decades ago, the average per capita income of each country 
would have been one-fifth lower than it is today (Baldwin, 1994 & Sarker & Jayasinghe, 
2007). This implies that deepening and widening the regional integration in Africa has a 
significant potential to spur the exports and economic growth of member countries.   
42 For example, in the EAC REC, 67% of imports destined for Uganda (40%) and Tanzania (27%), while in ECCAS, 52% of 
imports are destined for Gabon (29%) and Chad (24%). Similarly, in ECOWAS, about 58% of imports are destined for Cote 
d’Ivoire (23%), Ghana (23%), and Nigeria (12%). In SADC, roughly 66 % of imports are destined for South Africa (21 %), 
Zambia (18 %), Zimbabwe (17%), and Mozambique (11%). Likewise, in COMESA, about 47% of imports are destined for 
Sudan (13%), Democratic Republic of Congo (12%), Uganda (12 %), and Egypt (11%) (IMF DOT, 2013). 
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3.6 Annexure 
A1. Exporting Countries in the samples 
34 African plus 115 non- African countries. 
List of African countries:  
Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Congo P.R., Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, 
Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
List of Countries outside Africa:  
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Faeroe Islands, Fiji, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macao-China, 
Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent the Grenadines and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Island, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, UK, USA, Uruguay, 
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen 
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A2. Additional Explanatory Tables and Graphs 
Table 13: African Regional Economic Community 
CEN-SAD COMESA ECOWAS 
Founding states (1998): 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, 
Mali, Niger and Sudan 
Joined later: 
1999: Central African 
Republic and Eritrea 
2000:  Djibouti, Gambia and 
Senegal 
2001:  Egypt, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Somalia and Tunisia 
2002:  Benin and Togo 
2004:  Ivory Coast, Guinea-
Bissau and Liberia 
2005:  Ghana and Sierra 
Leone 
2007:  Comoros and Guinea 
2008:  Kenya, Mauritania 
and São Tomé and Príncipe 
Founding states (1994): 
Burundi, Comoros, DR 
Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe 
Joined later: Egypt (1999), 
Seychelles (2001), Libya 
(2006) and South Sudan 
(2011) 
Former members: 
1994-1997:  Lesotho 
and Mozambique 
1994-2000:  Tanzania 
1994-2004:  Namibia 
1994-2007:  Angola 
Founding states (1975): 
 Benin (UEMOA-94), 
Burkina Faso (UEMOA-94), 
Ivory Coast (UEMOA-94), 
Gambia (WAMZ-00), Ghana 
(WAMZ-00), Guinea 
(WAMZ-00), Guinea-Bissau 
(UEMOA-97), Liberia 
(WAMZ-10), Mali (UEMOA-
94), Niger (UEMOA-94), 
Nigeria (WAMZ-00), 
Senegal (UEMOA-94), 
Sierra Leone (WAMZ-00) 
and Togo (UEMOA-94) 
Joined later: 1976:  Cape 
Verde 
Former members: 1975-
2002:  Mauritania 
EAC SADC IGAD 
Founding states (2001): 
 Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
Joined later: 
2007:  Burundi and Rwanda 
 
ECCAS 
Founding states 
(1985):  Burundi, Cameroon 
(CEMAC-99), Central African 
Republic (CEMAC-99), Chad 
(CEMAC-99), Congo (CEMAC-
99), DR Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea (CEMAC-99), Gabon 
(CEMAC-99) and São Tomé 
and Príncipe 
Joined later: 1999:  Angola 
Former members: 
1985-2007:  Rwanda 
Founding states (1980): 
 Angola, Botswana (SACU-
70), Lesotho (SACU-70), 
Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland (SACU-70), 
Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe 
Joined later: 
1990:  Namibia (SACU-90) 
and South Africa (SACU-70) 
1995:  Mauritius 
1997:  DR Congo and 
Seychelles (withdrawn 
2004-2007) 
2005:  Madagascar 
Founding states (1986): 
 Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Somalia, Sudan and 
Uganda 
Joined later: 
1993:  Eritrea 
2011:  South Sudan 
UMA 1 
Founding states (1989): 
 Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco and Tunisia 
  
Source: compiled from http://www.dfa.gov.za/au.nepad/recs.htm and the economic community web 
pages 
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Table 14: Export of SSA by region in percentages 
Region 2010 2011 2012 
Advanced Economies 45.2 44.0 40.8 
Developing Asia 23.7 25.6 27.5 
European Union 26.7 26.1 23.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa 13.2 12.0 13.0 
Source: IMF Data Warehouse - Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) 
 
 
Table 15: Top SSA Export Partners shares in percentages 
Country 2010 2011 2012 
China(Mainland) 14.5 13.9 16.0 
United States 20.3 18.1 12.0 
India 7.8 6.5 8.0 
Netherlands 4.1 3.8 5.0 
Japan 2.8 3.2 4.0 
Spain 3.5 3.9 4.0 
Germany 3.4 3.8 4.0 
France 3.3 3.7 4.0 
United Kingdom 4.0 2.8 3.0 
South Africa 2.2 2.1 3.0 
Rest of World 34.1 38.3 37.0 
world 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: IMF Data Warehouse - Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) 
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Figure 3: Export of goods by region 
Source: IMF Data Mapper – DOT 
47 
 
Figure 4: Trends in SSA exports 
Source: IMF DOT 
 
Figure 5: Trends in SSA imports 
 
Source: IMF DOT 
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Figure 6: Countries’ average export share from the SSA REC of world total 
 
Source: IMF DOTS Database (2000–2009) 
 
Figure 7: Countries’ average import share from SSA REC of world total 
 
Source: IMF DOTS Database (2000–2009) 
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Figure 8: Taxes on international trade as percent of revenue by region in 2010 
Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org 
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Part II 
Empirical Assessments of the Impact of 
Migration on Trade 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis of Migrants’ Effects on Trade with a Focus 
on Africa 
4.1 Introduction 
Studies shows that business and social networks are important in facilitating international 
trade. These networks overcome informal trade barriers such as inadequate information 
about trade opportunities or weak international legal institutions. Ethnic groups living 
outside their countries of origin create formal or informal associations to which co-ethnic 
business people from both the host countries and the home country have access. In other 
words, these migrant networks serve as information exchange nodes (Rauch & Trindade, 
2002). As such, migrants can potentially foster international trade by reducing trade costs.  
Migrants, through their intervention as an information node, can reduce negotiation costs, 
contracting costs, or costs related to information barriers. In other words, migrants, through 
their trusted networks can reduce the costs of negotiating, enforcing contracts, and can 
deter opportunistic behaviour in weak institutional environments. This is possible because 
migrants have sufficient knowledge of their home and host country’s languages, regulations, 
market opportunities, and informal institutions. Informal trade transaction costs are large 
and can inhibit trade flows (Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2004; Chaney, 2011; Allen, 2014; 
Greif, 1993; Gould, 1994; Rauch, 1999; Rauch, 2001; Rauch & Trindade, 2002 & Dunlevy, 
2006).43  
A number of studies have investigated the impact of migrants on trade and their findings 
reveal that migrants indeed increase international trade. However, there is no study that 
43 If a business owner violates an agreement, he is blacklisted, which is worse than being sued, because the entire 
community will refrain from doing business with him. 
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focuses on and examines the impact of African migrants on trade. This study addresses this 
and investigates the issue in comparison to Asian migrants for two reasons. Firstly, unlike 
their Asian counterparts, African migrants are mainly destined for low income countries. 
Secondly, although the two regions started from almost the same level of economic growth 
in the 1960s, Asian countries are experiencing growth while most African countries not. As a 
result, Asian countries are able to export manufactured and differentiated goods while most 
African countries mainly export homogeneous commodities.44  
Econometrically, I employed a gravity model on a ten-year interval panel dataset of 136 
countries for the period 1970 to 2000. The data consists of bilateral trade and bilateral 
migration stocks and flows from a large sample of countries. Unlike prior studies, this 
research addressed the major issue of endogeneity due to omitted variable bias by 
incorporating bilateral pair, exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects in the gravity 
model. To the best of my knowledge this is the first paper that attempts to investigate African 
migrants’ effects on trade with regard to the role of the home country and the host country 
networks in reducing search, matching, and negotiation costs.   
The results reveal that while African migrants’ networks are found to have no impact, Asian 
migrants have significant and positive effects on their home countries’ exports to their 
destinations. On the other hand, migrants’ impact on imports in both regions is positive and 
significant. The differences in the trade effects of networks in Asia and Africa suggest that 
both the structure of the export sector in the home country and the nature of migration that 
mainly affect the migrants’ impact on home country exports.  
This study’s research results might be attributed to the following reasons. Firstly, the fact 
that fewer African migrants in comparison to Asian migrants are destined for high income 
countries might not affect the export catalyst capability of African migrants. In support of 
this assertion, Egger, Von Ehrlich, and Nelson’s (2012) study indicates that the trade-inducing 
effect of migrants is strong when the first migrants from a particular origin arrive, and then 
the impact declines to zero for migrant stocks greater than 4000. Secondly, Asian countries 
export more differentiated products while African countries export homogeneous 
44 For example, the percentage share of African food product exports in 1990 was 48%, while the figure for the Asian region 
was significantly lower. On the other hand, Asian countries’ share of the export of manufactured items was well over 35%, 
while that of Africa was only about 5% (Table 28). 
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commodities. For example, in 2000, the manufacturing exports as a percentage of 
merchandise exports in SSA was 26.84 % while for the EAP region it was 85.66 %. Similarly, 
the high-technology exports as a percentage of manufactured exports was 3.76 % for SSA, 
while it was 33.25% for the EAP region (Tables 26-28 and Figures 12-15). Moreover, studies 
show that it is not the revenue generated from foreign trade but rather the remittances 
home that provide resilience in Africa in times of disasters and conflicts (Naude, 2010). 
The remaining topics are organised as follows. Section 4.2 deals with the review of related 
literature, while section 4.3 elaborates on the methodological frame work adopted for the 
study. The main findings of the analysis are presented under section 4.4, while section 4.5 
presents the conclusion. 
4.2 Impact of Migration on Trade 
4.2.1 Comparison of the Nature of Migration of Asia and Africa 
Despite starting from a similar level of real GDP per capita, Africa and Asia have taken 
different economic growth trajectories. From the 1960s onwards, the African region 
experienced a sharp decline in its average growth rate, while most Asian economies were 
able to sustain a positive average growth rate.45 This difference in economic growth 
significantly affects both the nature of migration and the export structure in both regions. 
The majority of African migrants settle in low-income countries while the relatively larger 
proportion of Asian migrants (in comparison to African migrants) settle in developed 
countries (Fig 9).46 Both the relative and absolute migration stocks of Asian migrants in 
developed countries is higher than that of Africa. African countries’ migration is mainly 
within the low-wage African countries, because African migration is mainly driven by 
conflicts, environmental pressures, and artificial borders.47   
45 Although the rate of economic growth in Africa has risen recently, this region still remains the lowest income region in 
the world. 
 
46 More workers from Asian countries migrate to non-OECD countries (mainly within the region) as well. However, the skills 
of Asian migrants to OECD and non-OECD countries differ. Unlike the non-OECD countries, labour migration to OECD 
countries is mainly highly skilled (Xing, Dumont & Baruah, 2014). 
 
47 Remittances to Africa do seem to increase significantly after a natural disaster. Poorer countries tend to receive more 
remittances than richer countries (Naudé & Bezuidenhout, 2014). 
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There are major differences in the reasons for migration and the destinations that African 
and Asian migrants choose. Studies show that African migration is mostly forced in nature. 
In other words, the significant determinants of African migrations are armed conflict and lack 
of job opportunities. International migration flow from SSA countries is very volatile and 
usually destined for other SSA countries. There is relatively less migration from low-wage 
African countries to high-wage regions than migration within low-wage Africa (Naude, 
2010).48  
Figure 9: African and Asian migrants stock in developed countries 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013). Trends in International 
Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, 
POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013). 
48 The same study shows that an additional 1% reduction in relative growth is found to reduce emigration by 1.5 per 1,000 
inhabitants 
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Given that migration is costly, most African migrants from low per capita income countries 
cannot travel too far (Naude, 2010). On the other hand, absence of conflicts and relatively 
better per capita income in Asian economies means that Asian migration is mainly driven by 
the income effect.  
Figure 10: Share of African and Asian migrants in developed countries 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013). Trends in International 
Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, 
POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013). 
Out of the total migrant stock, the percentage of African migrants in developed countries is 
only 8%. The corresponding figure for the Asian migrants is 30% (Fig 10). There are also 
significant differences in net migrations49 between African and Asian regions. Hosting the 
second-largest population of international migrants, Africa is the region with the highest 
growth rate in net migration in the world (Fig 11). 
Figure 11: Changes in net migration by region (2000-2005) 
Source:  Naude (2010) 
49 The net migration is the difference between immigration and emigration, and is also quite different for SSA migrants.   
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4.2.2 Impact of Migration on Trade 
The complementarity between trade and migration was recognised by trade economists only 
few decades ago (Head & Ries, 1998 & Gould, 1994). However, doubts persist as to whether 
trading partners’ cultural aĸnities or bilateral economic policies drive the observed positive 
correlations (Lucas, 2005; Hanson & McIntosh, 2010 & Hanson, 2010). Such complementarity 
has been shown to prevail mostly for trade where ethnic networks help to overcome 
information problems (Rauch & Trindade, 2002).  
The main channels through which migrants increase trade is through information and the 
trust or contract-enforcement channel. Lack of information about international trade and 
investment opportunities is one of the informal barriers to trade. Migrants provide relevant 
information about available products and tastes for the right differentiated products, thus 
reducing information costs, and as a result help to increase trade (Rauch, 1996). Migrant 
networks provide this trust through cultural proximity, repeated transactions, and 
knowledge of implicit business rules (Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, 2009).  However, migration 
could also have a negative effect on bilateral trade when the trade substitution migration 
effect occurs. In other words, migrants can apply their knowledge about technology or 
production methods and about tastes and preferences to host-country production or 
transmit them to local producers in such a way that previously imported goods could be 
substituted by local production (Rauch, 1996). 
Migration may also facilitate the formation of the types of business links that lead to foreign 
direct investment (FDI) project deployment in a particular location. Migrants’ sheer presence 
in the host country can be a catalyst to establish the required links to achieve efficient 
distribution, procurement, transportation, and satisfaction of regulations. In developing 
countries, migrants can be the bridge that solves uncertainties related to trade and 
investment opportunities.  
Many studies found a positive correlation between migration and trade using augmented 
gravity models. The results of these studies reveal that the impact of a 10% increase in 
migrant population range from 0.1 to 2.5% rise on merchandise exports and 0.1 to 3.1% on 
merchandise imports (Felbermayr, Jung & Toubal, 2010; Herander & Saavedra, 2005; 
Dunlevy, 2006; White & Tadesse, 2008; Hatzigeorgiou, 2010; Peri & Francisco, 2010; Head & 
56 
 
Ries, 1998; Felbermayr & Toubal, 2012; Girma & Yi, 2002; White, 2007; Koenig, 2009 & Tai, 
2009).50  
A few studies have pointed to a positive correlation between migration and trade, which is 
often interpreted as evidence of a positive migrants’ externality. Nevertheless, the study on 
causality from migration to trade has yet to be conclusively established (Felbermayr, 
Grossmann & Kohler, 2012). The question whether it is trading partner's cultural affinity or 
bilateral economic policies that drive the observed positive correlations have not been 
established (Lucas, 2005 & Hanson, 2010).51  
Migrants also affect trade indirectly via technology and knowledge transfers. The 
mechanisms of migrants effect on trade via technology transfer is discussed in Annex A2. 
4.3 Data and methods 
4.3.1 Data 
The gravity model was estimated on a ten-year interval panel database of 137 exporting 
countries for the period 1970 to 2010. Specifically, the sample included 34 African, 23 Asian, 
and 80 rest of the world countries. The total number of observations is 28,796. The nominal 
bilateral trade data is sourced from UN COMTRADE while nominal GDP comes from the WB 
WDI database. Distance and other control variables are sourced from CEPII, while the data 
for migration comes from the WB’s global bilateral migration database. The global bilateral 
migrants’ stock database is a vast collection of destination country data sources detailing 
migrant stock from numerous origin countries and regions. It is constructed by combining 
over 100 censuses and population register records (UNECA, 2012). The nominal data of 
export flow and GDP are scaled by exporter GDP deflators to generate real trade flows and 
real GDPs. All the zero trade flows are excluded.  
50 The study on the effect of the average length of stay of a migrant in the host area by Herander & Saavedra (2005) shows 
a positive effect on exports while its square has a negative effect. 
 
51 In the literature dealing with migration effect of trade, it is generally argued that the immigrants positively influence 
bilateral trade flows. Migrants are in a privileged position to provide information about distribution networks and about 
demand in their home countries to host country exporters. They are also in a privileged position to provide the same type 
of information on the host country to home country exporters (Rauch, 1996 and Greif, 1993). 
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4.3.2 Estimation Method 
It is well documented in the literature that the gravity model that uses bilateral- pair, 
exporter-year and importer- year fixed effects is likely to be the preferred gravity 
specification, because it controls time-variant multilateral resistance terms associated with 
the exporter and the importer. The bilateral migration rates from the same origin country to 
two or more destinations is influenced by the attractiveness of migration to other alternative 
destinations. The same applies to the migration flows originating from different origins and 
directed to the same destination country.52 Some of the factors that drive migration, such as 
differences in the GDPs of origin and destinations of migrants may also affect trade, resulting 
in the error term correlating with the variable of our interest-making OLS, to provide biased 
estimations (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007; Bertoli & Moraga, 2015, Hanson, 2010, Bertoli, 
Moraga & Orgeta, 2011 & Bertoli & Moraga, 2013). The OLS equation is likely to yield biased 
estimates of the effects of migration on exports, because the explanatory variables of 
interest, such as Log (Migrationijt)*Asia, Log (Migrationijt)*Africa, and Log 
(Migrationijt)*ROW may be correlated to the error term ߝ௜௝௧ଵ  due to endogeneity resultant 
from the omitted variable bias. 
To summarise, studies show that the determinants of migration include origin- or 
destination-specific factors such as income, and other dyadic factors such as networks that 
are correlated with unobserved cultural proximity of the pair countries (Rauch, 1999; Bertoli 
& Moraga, 2015; Karemera, Oguledo & Davis, 2000; Pedersen, Pytlikova & Smith, 2008; and 
Kim & Cohen, 2010).53 However, these migration determinants also tend to explain trade 
flows between countries. Hence, when left uncorrected, the endogeneity may over- or 
under-estimate coefficients of interest. In other words, in gravity estimations, the error term 
52 For example, the EU-type supranational level of coordination of visa policy at destination country, which can exert a 
substantial influence on the scale of bilateral migration flows.  Another example could be that the GDP at origin country 
can correlate to the GDP in some of the destination countries because of a partial business cycle synchronisation due to 
trade and investment flows or because of the exposure to common economic shocks. In addition, visa waivers depend on 
citizenship. Likewise, linguistic proximity that relies more closely on the country of birth and economic conditions in the 
country of last residence might also shape the incentives to migrate (Bertoli & Moraga, 2015; Hanson, 2010; Bertoli et al., 
2011; & Bertoli & Moraga, 2013). 
 
53 Increases in distance can be a proxies for increases in transportation cost and psychological cost. 
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may represent unobserved heterogeneity in trade flow determinants associated with the 
likelihood of migration.  
Theoretically, omitted variables, simultaneity, and measurement errors can cause 
endogeneity. However, following Baier and Bergstrand’s (2007) argument, the most 
important source of endogeneity–the omitted variable (and selection) bias–can be justified.  
My argument is as follows. Since migration is measured based on the count of people, the 
likelihood of measurement error of the variable is not that much a concern. As a result, this 
possibility may safely be ruled out. The possibility of simultaneity bias is probable, but it may 
also be argued to be less serious. Trade-inducing migration occurs mainly when migrants are 
destined for high income countries. Although the growth literature reveals that the GDP is 
theoretically endogenous to bilateral trade flows, there are some definite explanations that 
motivate a general disregard for the potential endogeneity of GDP and export.54  
Nevertheless, other determinants of migration might also cause simultaneity bias. The best 
option to resolve the problem of endogeneity is of course to construct an exogenous 
instrument for migration. However, this is beyond the scope of this study, and hence this 
research used the same method adopted in previous studies.  Thus, this research focuses 
mainly on removing the endogeneity due to omitted variable bias. Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) clarify that the omitted variable bias arises by disregarding multi-lateral 
trade resistance terms that capture the idea that trade choices are established on relative 
rather than absolute prices. In a panel setting, the presence of country-pair and country-year 
dummies can be employed to treat endogeneity arising from the omission of multilateral 
resistance terms (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007 & Gil-Pareja et. al., 2014). 
The estimation starts with the baseline OLS specification as shown under specification (4.1). 
ܮ݋݃൫ܧݔ݌௜௝௧൯ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௜௧) + ߚଶܮ݋݃൫ܩ݀݌௝௧൯+ ߚଷܮ݋݃൫ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝൯+ ߚସܤ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝
+ ߚହܮܽ݊݃ݑܽ݃݁௜௝ + ߚ଺ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝௧ + ߚ଻ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝ + ߚ଼ܴܶܣ௜௝௧
+ ߚଽܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣݏ݅ܽ + ߚଵ଴ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ
+ ߚଵଵܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܴܱܹ + ߝ௜௝௧ଵ  
(4.1) 
54 Firstly, the GDP is a function of net multilateral exports, which on average tend to be less than 5% of a country's GDP, 
and its connection to gross exports is much less direct. Secondly, the gravity equation relates bilateral trade flows to 
countries' GDPs, which are a very small share of a country's multilateral exports. Thirdly, previous studies indicate that the 
potential endogeneity of GDPs with export is insignificant (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). 
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where the variables are defined as follows: 
Log (Expijt): the log of country i export to country j at time t. 
Log (GDPit) and Log (GDPjt): the GDP of country i and country j at time t respectively. 
Log (Distij): the log of distance between the trading pairs. 
Contigij: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs share common borders. 
Langij: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs have a common language. 
Currencyijt: a dummy variable on whether the trading pairs have common currency. 
Landlockedij: a dummy variable on whether either the exporter or the importer or both are 
landlocked countries. 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯: the log of the stock of migrants of origin country i in the destination 
country j at time t.  
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣݏ݅ܽ: the multiplication of the log of migration stock variable with 
Asia dummy (1 if the country is the migrants origin country is in Asia and 0 otherwise). 
 ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ: the multiplication of the log of migration stock variable with 
Africa dummy (1 if the country of origin of the migrant is in  Africa and 0 otherwise). 
 ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܴܱܹ: the multiplication of the log of migration stock variable with 
rest of the world (ROW) dummy (1 if the country of origin of the migrants is in the ROW and 
0 otherwise). 
The baseline OLS specification was estimated with year dummies. In addition, the time 
invariant fixed effects through the incorporation of bilateral pair (ߚ௜௝) fixed effects with and 
without year dummies was also taken into account. However, similar to the OLS 
specification, these specification also lead to biased coefficient estimates, as these 
specifications failed to take into account time-varying fixed effects. I addressed the 
endogeneity (due to omitted variable bias) of ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ by including bilateral pair 
(ߚ௜௝), exporter-year (ߚ௜௧), and importer-year (ߚ௜௧) dummies as shown in equation (5.2). This 
specification is my preferred specification hence the interpretation of the results is mainly 
based on this specification.  
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ܮ݋݃൫ܧݔ݌௜௝௧൯ = ߚ଴ + ߚ௜௝ + ߚ௜௧ + ߚ௝௧ + ߚଵܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௜௧) + ߚଶܮ݋݃൫ܩ݀݌௝௧൯ + ߚଷܮ݋݃൫ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝൯
+ ߚସܤ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝ + ߚହܮܽ݊݃ݑܽ݁௜௝ + ߚ଺ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝௧ + ߚ଻ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝
+ ߚ଼ܴܶܣ௜௝௧ + ߚଽܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣݏ݅ܽ + ߚଵ଴ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯
כ ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ + ߚଵଵܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܴܱܹ + ߝ௜௝௧ଶ  
(4.2) 
Also note that similar regressions to equation (4.1) and equation (4.2) were run where the 
dependent variable is the log of import (ܮ݋݃൫ܫ݉݌௜௝௧൯) and it was used to establish the results 
presented under section 4.4.2.  
4.4 Results 
The results of the study are presented in the subsequent sections. The results are first 
presented by correcting endogeneity and then by correcting it. Although the first set of 
results are biased and inconsistent, these give some idea as to the extent of bias if 
endogeneity is not addressed.55 However, the research mainly focuses discussion of the 
results based mainly on the unbiased estimations. In most tables, column (1) to column (4) 
contains biased estimates, since they do not take into account the multilateral prices terms 
that might potentially affect both migration and exports. The estimation that takes the issue 
of endogeneity into account effectively is presented under column 5. Some of the tables only 
present the equivalent of column 5 for convenience.  
The main findings of this research’s results show that African migrants do not have a 
significant effect on their home countries’ exports to destinations, while Asian migrants do. 
However, this research’s results show that both African and Asian migrants have positive and 
significant effects on their home countries’ imports from destination countries. This reveals 
that it might be the structure of the home countries’ export sector as opposed to the nature 
of migration that influences the impact of migrants on home country exports.  
4.4.1 Migrants’ Effects on Exports 
The results shown under Table 1, column 5 reveal that the migrants’ impact on exports for 
African and rest of the world is found to be insignificant.56 However, the coefficient estimate 
55 However, the results might be still biased because reverse causality has not been addressed.   
56 This might possibly be due to the labour movement, and social and human capital effects offset one another. The recent 
literature shows that migration has labour movement (substitute trade) and social and human capital movement (enhanced 
trade) effects. The labour movement effect reduces trade since it could equalise wages if migration was undertaken on a 
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for Africa shown in column 5 has a negative sign, while it is positive for the rest of the world, 
although it is statistically insignificant. Africa’s negative sign may be due to the fact that most 
African migration is forced in nature (a further explanation of the nature of African migration 
is presented in the Annexure). However, this research study’s results show that Asian 
migrant studies reveal that migrant intake has a positive sustainable impact on their home 
countries’ exports. For African countries, this research’s finding does not empirically confirm 
that migration causes trade, while for Asian countries it was established that a 10% rise in 
Asian migrant stock is more likely to raise the migrants’ home countries’ export to the 
destination country by 0.7% (Table 16). 
Table 16: Regional differences in migrants’ effects on home country exports 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣݏ݅ܽ 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.07*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ 0.07*** 0.05*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.03 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܴܱܹ 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.03** 0.02 0.02 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௜௧) 0.86*** 0.98*** 0.75*** 0.94***  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)  
ܮ݋݃൫ܩ݀݌௝௧൯ 0.63*** 0.72*** 0.48*** 0.59***  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)  
ܮ݋݃(ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝) -0.89*** -0.96***    
  (0.02) (0.02)    
ܤ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝ 0.22*** 0.18**    
  (0.07) (0.07)    
ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝ -0.48*** -0.44***    
  (0.03) (0.03)    
ܮܽ݊݃ݑܽ݃݁௜௝ 0.43*** 0.60***    
  (0.03) (0.03)    
ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝௧ 0.76*** 0.92***    
  (0.10) (0.10)    
ܴܶܣ௜௝௧ 0.53*** 0.69*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.62*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 6.90*** 6.42*** 2.61*** 0.04 13.63*** 
  (0.16) (0.17) (0.12) (0.41) (0.27) 
Observations 27170 27170 27170 27170 28796 
R-squared 0.62 0.63       
The gravity includes      
   ɴt No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
massive scale. On the other hand, the social capital and human capital movement effect increases trade since it provides 
market information. Hence, the net impact of migration on trade thus depends on which effect has the most weight, since 
the two effects work together to affect trade. 
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   ɴij No No Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴt нɴij No No No Yes Yes 
   ɴij нɴitнɴjt No No No No Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable for specifications is the (natural log of 
the) bilateral trade flow. 
 
To strengthen the validity of the claims made above, I eliminated possible regional outliers, 
i.e. regional countries that differ significantly from others in the region in terms of income. 
In other words, I ran the same regression excluding regional outliers (i.e. North African 
countries and Hong Kong, Macao and Brunei Darussalam) yet similar conclusions were 
reached. Like the previous results, I established that African migrants have statistically 
insignificant effects on their origin country’s exports to their destination country. On the 
other hand, Asian migrants increase their home countries’ exports. The results reveal that in 
African countries migration has a statistically insignificant effect on trade, while in Asian 
countries, a 10% increase in the number of Asian migrants in country j increases their home 
countries’ export to their destination countries by 0.7%. (Table 17). 
Table 17: Effect of migrants on export – possible regional outliers dropped 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣݏ݅ܽ1 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.07*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ2 0.11*** 0.10*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.04 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܴܱܹ 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௜௧) 0.88*** 1.00*** 0.75*** 0.95***  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)  
ܮ݋݃൫ܩ݀݌௝௧൯ 0.63*** 0.72*** 0.48*** 0.59***  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)  
ܮ݋݃(ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝) -0.88*** -0.96***    
  (0.02) (0.02)    
ܤ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝ 0.20*** 0.14*    
  (0.07) (0.07)    
ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝ -0.49*** -0.46***    
  (0.03) (0.03)    
ܮܽ݊݃ݑܽ݃݁௜௝ 0.41*** 0.59***    
  (0.03) (0.04)    
ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝௧ 0.73*** 0.84***    
  (0.10) (0.10)    
ܴܶܣ௜௝௧ 0.55*** 0.71*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.62*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 6.62*** 6.14*** 2.61*** -0.01 13.93*** 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.12) (0.41) (0.25) 
Observations 27,170 27,170 27,170 27,170 28,796 
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R-squared 0.62 0.63    
R-squared   0.43 0.43 0.55 
The gravity includes      
   ɴt No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴij No No Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴt нɴij No No No Yes Yes 
   ɴij нɴitнɴjt No No No No Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable for specifications is the (natural log 
of the) bilateral trade flow. (1) Excluding Hong Kong SAR, Macao SAR, and Brunei Darussalam. (2) Excluding North African countries. 
 
In addition, I also checked their claims’ stability by regressing and estimating the variables of 
their interest separately. Similarly, the results also reveal that the research’s findings are 
consistent. In other words, African migrants are less likely to promote their origin country’s 
exports to their destination countries while Asian migrants significantly promote their home 
countries’ export to their destinations (Table 18). 
Table 18: Effect of Migration on Export – Separate estimation 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable for 
specifications is the (natural log of the) bilateral trade flow.  
Earlier studies show that migration (mainly to OECD countries) create trade. I ran regression 
to investigate the effect of migrants destined for high income countries on their home 
countries’ export. Since this procedure confirmed the results of earlier similar studies, it may 
assist me to strengthen his earlier claims since it reveals that the research’s model is sound.  
In line with this, I further checked whether migrants destined for high income countries 
create more trade links than migrants destined for other income destinations. Consistent 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3)  
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣݏ݅ܽ 0.05*   
  (0.03)   
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ  -0.06**  
   (0.03)  
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܴܱܹ   -0.00 
   (0.02) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ 0.01 0.03** 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
ܴܶܣ௜௝௧ 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 13.94*** 13.67*** 14.28*** 
 (0.35) (0.32) (0.33) 
Observations 28,796 28,796 28,796 
R-squared 0.55 0.55 0.55 
The gravity includes    
   ɴij нɴitнɴjt Yes Yes Yes 
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with earlier studies, this research established that migrants destined for high income 
destinations seem to have a positive and significant effect on the migrants’ home country 
exports to the migrants’ destination countries. Specifically, this research reveals that a 10% 
rise of migrants in high income countries increase their origin countries’ exports to high 
income destinations by 0.5% (Table 19). 
Table 19: Effect of migration on export to high income countries destination 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܪ݄݅݃_݅݊ܿ_ܦ݁ݏݐ 0.25*** 0.18*** 0.04** 0.03* 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܱݐ݄݁ݎ_ܦ݁ݏݐ 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.03** 0.04** -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௜௧) 0.83*** 0.95*** 0.76*** 0.98***  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)  
ܮ݋݃൫ܩ݀݌௝௧൯ 0.63*** 0.72*** 0.48*** 0.60***  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)  
ܮ݋݃(ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝) -0.88*** -0.94***    
  (0.02) (0.02)    
ܤ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝ 0.33*** 0.27***    
  (0.07) (0.07)    
ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝ -0.55*** -0.51***    
  (0.03) (0.03)    
ܮܽ݊݃ݑܽ݃݁௜௝ 0.42*** 0.56***    
  (0.03) (0.03)    
ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝௧ 0.59*** 0.76***    
  (0.10) (0.10)    
ܴܶܣ௜௝௧ 0.44*** 0.61*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.61*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 7.02*** 5.40*** 2.56*** -1.20** 16.13*** 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.12) (0.50) (0.07) 
Observations 26,980 26,980 26,980 26,980 28,606 
R-squared 0.63 0.64    
R-squared   0.43 0.44 0.56 
The gravity includes      
   ɴt No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴij No No Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴt нɴij No No No Yes Yes 
   ɴij нɴitнɴjt No No No No Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable for specifications is the (natural log of 
the) bilateral trade flow. 
I checked the consistency and stability of their estimates as a robustness check on the effect 
of migrants on the export of differentiated products. The findings of the robustness analysis 
also strengthened my earlier claim that African migrants have an insignificant effect on their 
home countries’ exports while Asian migrants have a significant effect. This research 
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established that migrants are more likely to promote the export of differentiated products 
than homogeneous products and manufactured products rather than agricultural goods.57  
The migrants’ effect on their home countries’ export of agricultural goods is found to be 
statistically insignificant. For manufactured and differentiated products, Asian and the other 
international migrants have significant and positive effects on their home countries’ exports, 
while African migrants have an insignificant effect. I also found that African migrants have a 
strong positive and significant effect on homogeneous product exports, while it is 
insignificant for Asia and rest of the world. Given that African economies have a relatively 
weak industrial base, this research’s finding is highly plausible (Table 20). This study’s results 
are consistent with earlier related empirical works. The literature reveals that migrants are 
more likely to promote the export of differentiated products than homogeneous products 
(Rauch & Trindade, 2002 & Bettin & Turco, 2012).58 
A close investigation of the major export items from African and Asian countries strengthens 
this study’s findings. African exports are predominantly comprised of homogeneous goods, 
while Asian economies mostly export differentiated and manufactured products. For 
example, the percentage share of food products export by Africa in 1990 was 48%59 while 
the figure for the Asian region was significantly low (see Table 25 in the A 
nnexure).  In other words, the nature and structure of the African export sector explains why 
African migrants have a positive and significant effect on the export of homogeneous 
products.  
Table 20: Robustness check – Migrants’ effect on exports by product type 
 Agricultural Manufactured Homogeneous Differentiated 
VARIABLES goods goods goods goods 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣݏ݅ܽ -0.01 0.08*** -14.59 0.05* 
  (0.03) (0.02) (8.31) (0.03) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ -0.02 -0.02 2.73*** -0.03 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.84) (0.03) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܴܱܹ -0.02 0.04*** -0.77 0.05*** 
57 The products are classified using the Rauch Classification of Goods frequently used in international trade literatures.  
 
58 According to Bettin & Turco (2012), the south-north migration and trade reveals that migration enhances the import of 
primary and final goods (preference channel), the export of differentiated goods, and low elasticity of substitution goods 
(information channel). However, their study shows that there is no evidence that migration influences the export of labour-
intensive goods (technology channel). 
 
59 As reported under Table 27, the structure of African export today is also the same.  
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 (0.02) (0.01) (0.58) (0.01) 
ܴܶܣ௜௝௧ 0.60*** 0.39*** 7.73 0.54*** 
  (0.07) (0.06) (4.52) (0.06) 
Constant 13.04*** 12.73*** 14.96*** 13.46*** 
 (0.31) (0.35) (3.01) (0.52) 
Observations 24,729 26,705 1,772 25,322 
R-squared 0.45 0.65 0.99 0.66 
The gravity includes     
   ɴij нɴitнɴjt Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable for specifications is the (natural log of 
the) bilateral trade flow.  
 
I ran regressions of the entire sample to check consistency of his findings with earlier related 
empirical studies, and was able to conclude that his estimates are consistent with previous 
studies’ findings. In other words, the research also establishes that generally migrants 
promote their home countries’ exports to their destination countries. Additionally, the 
research established that migrants are more likely to promote the export of manufactured 
goods than agricultural products, and more likely to promote the export of differentiated 
goods than homogeneous goods (Table 21). 
Table 21: Robustness check – Migrants’ effect on exports by product type for all samples 
 Export 
(Total) 
Agricultural 
Export 
Manufacturing 
Export 
Homogeneous 
Goods export 
Differentiated 
Goods Export VARIABLES 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ 0.02* -0.02 0.04*** 0.15 0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.71) (0.01) 
ܴܶܣ௜௝௧ 0.68*** 0.60*** 0.40*** 0.65 0.55*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (5.88) (0.06) 
Constant 13.24*** 13.02*** 12.89*** 11.11*** 13.40*** 
 (0.24) (0.37) (0.50) (2.32) (0.52) 
Observations 34,620 24,729 26,705 1,772 25,322 
R-squared 0.55 0.45 0.65 0.97 0.66 
The gravity includes     
   ɴij нɴitнɴjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable for specifications is the (natural log of 
the) bilateral trade flow. All regressions include country time and bilateral fixed effects. 
 
This research study’s results are comparable to the findings of earlier similar studies, since 
most of them reveal that the impact of a 10% increase in migrant population ranges from a 
0.1 to 2.5% rise in merchandise exports, and a 0.1 to 3.1% increase in merchandise imports 
( Felbermayr, Jung & Toubal, 2010; Herande & Saavedra, 2005; Dunlevy, 2006; White & 
Tadesse, 2008; Hatzigeorgiou, 2010; Peri & Francisco, 2010; Head & Ries, 1998; Felbermayr 
& Toubal, 2012; Girma & Yi, 2002; White, 2007; Koenig, 2009 & Tai, 2009) 
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4.4.2 Migrants’ Effects on Imports 
The literature reveals that migrants not only promote their home countries’ exports to a 
destination, but also facilitate imports from their home country to their destination countries 
(Head & Ries, 1998 & Girma & Yi, 2002). Similarly, the information advantage–and hence 
reductions in transaction costs–enables migrants to facilitate both the exports from the 
migrants’ home countries and the imports to the migrants’ destination countries. This 
research study’s results confirm that migrants also positively and significantly impact the 
imports to the migrants’ home country from their destination countries (Table 22). 
Table 22: Gravity estimation of the migrants’ effect on imports 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣݏ݅ܽ 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.08** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.05* 0.06* 0.06** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܴܱܹ 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.01 -0.01 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ܮ݋݃(ܩ݀݌௜௧) 0.78*** 0.91*** 0.57*** 0.81***  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)  
ܮ݋݃൫ܩ݀݌௝௧൯ 0.65*** 0.74*** 0.61*** 0.71***  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)  
ܮ݋݃(ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝) -0.83*** -0.91***    
  (0.02) (0.02)    
ܤ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝ 0.22*** 0.17**    
  (0.07) (0.07)    
ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝ -0.13*** -0.05    
  (0.04) (0.04)    
ܮܽ݊݃ݑܽ݃݁௜௝ 0.45*** 0.60***    
  (0.03) (0.03)    
ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ௜௝௧ 0.89*** 1.05***    
  (0.10) (0.10)    
ܴܶܣ௜௝௧ 0.59*** 0.72*** 0.56*** 0.53*** 0.64*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0483) (0.0572) (0.0579) (0.0588) 
Constant 6.88*** 6.45*** 3.33*** -0.36 16.26*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.51) (0.06) 
Observations 25,720 25,720 25,720 25,720 26,934 
R-squared 0.61 0.63    
Within R-squared   0.43 0.44 0.58 
The gravity includes      
   ɴt No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴij No No Yes Yes Yes 
   ɴt нɴij No No No Yes Yes 
   ɴij нɴitнɴjt No No No No Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable for specifications is the 
(natural log of the) bilateral trade flow. 
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Additionally, the analysis of the effect of product differentiation reveals that the migrants’ 
effect is significant and positive for the total and manufactured goods’ imports for all regions 
(Table 23).  Given the structure of Africa’s imports, the results are plausible. Most of Africa’s 
imports are composed of manufactured products that roughly constitute 65% of Africa’s 
imports (UN COMTRADE). This figure is not surprising since African countries have weaker 
industrial bases. In other words, given the classical and neoclassical trade theories, Africa’s 
import basket should rightly contain relatively more manufactured goods imported from 
regions with more developed and more complex industrial bases. 
Table 23: Migrants’ Effect on import to home country from destination country by region 
VARIABLES Import 
(Total) 
Differentiated 
goods 
Homogeneous 
goods 
Manuf. 
goods 
Agric. 
goods 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣݏ݅ܽ 0.08** 0.11*** 1.30 0.07** 0.04 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.99) (0.04) (0.04) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܣ݂ݎ݅ܿܽ 0.06** -0.03 -0.43 0.07** -0.01 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.97) (0.03) (0.04) 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ כ ܴܱܹ 0.02* 0.02* 0.26 0.03*** 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.35) (0.01) (0.01) 
ܴܶܣ௜௝௧ 0.64*** 0.60*** 0.10 0.43*** 0.68*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (5.51) (0.06) (0.07) 
Constant 14.52*** 13.79*** 11.00*** 13.63*** 13.54*** 
 (0.20) (0.53) (1.34) (0.35) (0.48) 
Observations 26,934 24,938 1,996 25,601 24,071 
R-squared 0.58 0.66 0.94 0.66 0.46 
The gravity includes     
   ɴij нɴitнɴjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable for specifications is the (natural log of 
the) bilateral trade flow. All regressions include country time and bilateral fixed effects. 
 
It was established that the migrants’ effect in facilitating their home countries’ imports from 
the migrants’ destination countries is stronger for manufactured products. Specifically, a 
10% increase in migration results in a 0.4 % increase in manufactured goods imported by 
migrants’ home countries from the migrants’ destinations. Similarly, migrants also positively 
affect their home countries’ imports from their destination country for the total imports as 
well as differentiated, manufactured, and agricultural product imports (Table 24).  
Table 24: Migrants’ effect on their destination country’s imports 
 Import 
(Total) 
Differentiated 
goods import 
Homogeneous 
goods import 
Manuf. 
import 
Agric. 
import VARIABLES 
ܮ݋݃൫ܯ݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧൯ 0.03*** 0.02** 0.17 0.04*** 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.32) (0.01) (0.01) 
ܴܶܣ௜௝௧  0.64*** 0.60*** 1.06 0.43*** 0.68*** 
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 (0.06) (0.06) (5.46) (0.06) (0.07) 
Constant 14.45*** 13.21*** 10.54*** 13.96*** 13.58*** 
 (0.23) (0.33) (1.31) (0.43) (0.45) 
Observations 26,934 24,938 1,996 25,601 24,071 
R-squared 0.58 0.66 0.94 0.66 0.46 
The gravity includes     
   ɴij нɴitнɴjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable for specifications is the (natural log of 
the) bilateral trade flow. All regressions include country time and bilateral fixed effects. 
4.5 Conclusion 
A number of studies have investigated migrants’ impact on trade and found that migrants 
increase international trade. However, to date there has been no study that focuses on and 
examines African migrants’ impact on trade. This dissertation investigated African migrants’ 
trade creation effects in comparison to their Asian counterparts by using a gravity model on 
a ten-year interval panel dataset of 136 countries for the period ranging 1970 to 2010.  
This research’s results reveal that African migrants do not have a statistically significant 
impact on their home countries’ exports. Conversely, Asian migrants promote their home 
countries’ exports to their destinations. Specifically, this research study’s results show that 
a 10% increase in the number of Asian migrants increases their home country exports to the 
migrants’ destination countries by 0.7%. Both African and Asian migrants are found to have 
a positive and significant impact on their home countries’ imports from their destination 
countries for both total and differentiated products. Given the differences in the structure 
of the export sectors and the main reasons for migration in Africa and Asia, I conclude that 
it might be the home countries’ export sector structure and not the reason for migration that 
mainly influences migrants’ ability to work as bridges between traders from their home and 
destination countries. 
4.6 Annex 
A1. List of countries 
Asian: 
Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Guinea, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Kiribati, Macao SAR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New, 
Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Island, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. 
African: 
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Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Rep., Congo, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, 
Sudan, Togo, Tanzania, Tunisia , Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
 
ROW of the World: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bermuda, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark, 
Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Faeroe Island, Finland, Germany, France, French, Guiana, 
French, Polynesia, Greece, Greenland, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Malta, Martinique, Mexico, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep. of Korea, Saint Lucia, 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, USA, United Arab Emirates, United 
Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
A2.  Migrants’ Effect on Trade via Technology Transfer 
Migrants also facilitate technology transfer by providing information to their home 
countries’ businessmen about importing possibilities of new and improved technologies that 
might in turn be used towards producing goods for the export market. In other words, 
migrants help diffuse technological spillover to their home countries because they maintain 
connections with their families and with other people in their home countries.60 The 
migrants can be an important source and facilitator of research and innovation, promoting 
technology transfer and skills development for a country exporting labour. Studies show that 
more industrialised labour-exporting countries with large skilled migrant populations were 
able use their expatriates to facilitate the technological spillover. These networks include 
networks of scientists and research and development (R&D) personnel, the business 
networks of knowledge-intensive start-up businesses, and the networks of professionals 
working for multinationals (Saxenian, 2008 & Page & Plaza, 2006).  
60 Prior studies reveal that the technological level of firms’ activities significantly affects their ability to compete in world 
markets. 
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Page and Plaza (2006) indicated that a migrant’s involvement in the transfer of technology 
in the sending countries’ economies can take several forms. These include:  
1. the licensing agreements between diaspora owned or managed firms in host 
countries and sending countries’ firms to provide technology transfer and know-how;  
2. the formation of a joint venture through direct investment in local firms;  
3. knowledge spill-over effects when returnee migrants assume top managerial 
positions in foreign-owned firms within their country of origin; 
4. the return to permanent employment in the sending country after work experience 
in the host country; 
5. the virtual return of professionals in the fields such as engineering and medicine 
through extended visits or electronic communications; and 
6. the formation of networks of scientists or professionals to promote research in host 
countries directed toward the sending countries’ needs (Page & Plaza, 2006). 
 
A3. Additional Explanatory Tables and Graphs 
Table 25: Share of major exports by product and region in 1990 
Product East Asia South Asia Sub Saharan Africa 
Wood 2.53 0.31 0.90 
Vegetable 2.29 11.46 29.37 
Transportation 15.51 2.01 1.19 
Textiles and clothing 6.38 31.08 5.64 
Stone and glass 2.10 14.77 0.62 
Plastic or rubber 3.50 1.56 0.36 
Miscellaneous 6.91 2.78 1.15 
Minerals 0.99 3.92 3.19 
Metals 6.60 3.56 0.22 
Machinery and electrical 35.74 4.56 1.24 
Hides and skins 1.05 5.41 0.44 
Fuels 6.81 2.66 0.23 
Footwear 1.23 2.46 0.06 
Food products 1.67 2.77 48.29 
Chemicals 4.41 6.72 0.71 
Animal 2.27 3.95 6.39 
Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org 
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Trade as a percentage of the GDP is higher in SSA than in EAP (Table 26). African imports 
more consumer goods while Asians import more capital goods and raw materials (Table 27). 
Table 26: Trade as percentage of the GDP by region 
Region 2010 2000 1990 
East Asia & Pacific 60.87 49.3 40.65 
Sub-Saharan Africa 61.32 63.73 50.3 
Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org 
Table 27: Import share by product type 
Product categories 
East Asia & Pacific Sub-Saharan Africa 
2010 2000 1990 2010 2000 1990 
Capital goods 37.35 38.79 27.86 30.05 27.51 29.74 
Consumer goods 20.45 22.48 22.37 33.96 30.54 34.34 
Intermediate goods 19.92 21.65 24.09 20.27 22.56 28.59 
Raw materials 20.44 15.42 24.13 12.2 14.45 5.79 
Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org 
 
Table 28: Export product share from the world’s export by product type 
Product categories 
 
East Asia & Pacific Sub-Saharan Africa 
2010 2000 1990 2010 2000 1990 
Animal 1.17 1.59 2.27 1.74 2.12 6.39 
Capital goods 44.24 44.36 40.24 7.08 4.83 2.2 
Chemicals 5.21 4.68 4.41 2.87 3.09 0.71 
Consumer goods 27.6 29.59 29.05 18.44 15.71 23.39 
Food products 1.49 1.35 1.67 5.96 6.27 48.29 
Footwear 1.36 1.65 1.23 0.29 0.17 0.06 
Fuels 6.47 4.7 6.81 41.09 42.84 0.23 
Hides and skins 0.85 1.31 1.05 1.41 0.53 0.44 
Intermediate goods 18.31 17.23 18.41 24.18 17.61 13.06 
Machinery and electric 39.03 41.9 35.74 3.97 3.32 1.24 
Metals 6.43 5.07 6.6 9.42 7.51 0.22 
Minerals 1.59 0.69 0.99 5.76 2.95 3.19 
Miscellaneous 9 9.32 6.91 1.07 5.41 1.15 
Plastic or rubber 4.59 3.84 3.5 1.66 0.97 0.36 
Raw materials 6.48 5.48 9.12 49.91 56.91 60.87 
Stone and glass 3.33 2.16 2.1 10.52 8.18 0.62 
Textiles and clothing 6.72 8.93 6.38 2.04 4.73 5.64 
Transportation 9.24 9.13 15.51 4.9 3.05 1.19 
Vegetable 1.97 1.68 2.29 5.16 5.26 29.37 
Wood 1.55 2.01 2.53 2.15 3.6 0.9 
Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org 
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Figure 12: Share of exports by products in East Asia & Pacific 
Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org
Figure 13: Share of imports by products in East Asia & Pacific 
         Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org 
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Figure 14: Share of imports by products in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org 
Figure 15: Share of imports by products in Sub Saharan Africa 
Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org 
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Part III 
Empirical Assessments on the Impact of Service 
Trade on Service Income 
 
V. Does Trade in Services Raise Service Income? Evidence from 
Cross-Country Regressions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The relationship between trade on one hand and income and growth on the other is both 
empirically and theoretically complicated. For example, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) have 
theoretically established that within a group of endogenous growth models exists no 
unambiguous relationship exists between trade liberalisation and growth. In static models, 
restrictions on trade in service, like restrictions on trade in goods are generally expected to 
reduce welfare because the reduction of the consumer surplus due to the higher price of the 
domestic service outweighs the increase in producer surplus and government revenue 
(Mattoo, Rathindran & Subramanian, 2006). Yet, if a country is a large importer of services, 
the restrictions on trade can be welfare-enhancing because the country may gain from its 
improved terms of trade.  
Similarly, empirical studies are far conclusive on the causal link between trade and income 
and growth. Frankel and Romer (1999) and Irwin and Tervio’s (2002) important studies try 
to address the reverse causality issue associated with the potential effect of income on trade, 
using geographical factors in the gravity equation to construct an instrument for trade. They 
found evidence that trade causes growth. However, these effects of trade on growth were 
obtained with low instead of robust precision, which was the point of criticism made by 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) and Rodriguez (2007). They argue that while geography is an 
important determinant of income, it is only one of the channels through which the former 
affects the latter.  
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Geography impacts income via its effect on a country’s public health and consequently its 
human capital, its agricultural productivity, and its institutional quality. For example, 
geography largely determines the extent to which a country is exposed to colonialism, 
migration, and wars, and consequently impacts the quality of its institutions and its income 
(Hall & Jones, 1999). Countries located completely or partially in tropical regions are also 
more likely to be subject to many infectious diseases than other regions, which may seriously 
impact their economic development (Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger, 1998 & Sachs, Warner, 
Åslund & Fischer., 1995). A country’s geographical location also determines the availability 
of its land endowments and consequently its agricultural productivity and economic growth 
(Engerman & Sokoloff, 1997). In order to address Rodriguez and Rodrik’s (2001) critique, 
Noguer and Siscart (2005) later included additional geographical controls for disease, 
resource endowment, agricultural productivity, and institutions, and found that the causal 
positive effect of trade on per capital income was robust, statistically significant at a 5% level, 
but its magnitude had decreased. 
This chapter uses comprehensive cross-country data of the service trade in 2000, 2005, and 
2010 to investigate the extent to which trade in services raises service per capita income. 
The focus on the service sector is motivated by the following reasons. Firstly, nowadays the 
service sector represents the largest component of GDPs in both developed and developing 
economies, and its importance has increased over time. According to the statistics from the 
WB’s WDI database, service has been the largest sector in the world economy for a long 
time. In 2014, 71% of the world’s GDP was produced in the tertiary sector, while the 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors only account for 16% and 4% of the world’s GDP 
respectively.  The service sector is not only the largest sector of the economy, but it is also 
the fastest growing sector. The importance of the service sector is increasing in the 
economy’s level of development. The service sector shares in the GDPs of low-income, 
middle-income and high-income economies in 2014 is 47%, 56%, and 74% respectively. 
Importantly, the service sector growth is considered to contribute more to poverty reduction 
than the growth in agriculture or manufacturing sector (WB, 2012b).    
Since the 1980s the service trade has been growing at a higher rate than trade in goods 
(UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2012).  Trade of services as a percentage of the GDP is 
about 20% of the GDP in high-income countries, while it is about 8% in low- and medium-
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income countries (WB and UN COMTRADE databases). The fact that the service sector is the 
largest component of the world’s GDP coupled with the growing rate of service trade 
certainly raises the question of whether (and the extent to which) the service trade might 
result in higher income and standard of living or whether it is a case of countries with higher 
incomes engaging in more service trade. This research question becomes more relevant in 
light of the national trade and growth strategies adopted by many countries in the aftermath 
of the 2007-08 economic and financial crisis. Specifically, an important component of their 
strategies is to develop service trade because the service sector has demonstrated relative 
resilience during times of the crises in terms of a lower magnitude of decline, less 
synchronisation across countries, and earlier recovery from crises (UNCTAD, 2010).   
Secondly, the results of this study on the relationship between service trade and service 
income also provide additional substantive inputs to the ongoing negotiations in which WTO 
members are currently involved in order to take further steps towards the liberalisation of 
the service trade. While the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was already 
enforced in 1995, it remains a loose framework for world trade in services, and still requires 
development. For example, WTO members of GATS still need to develop specific rules for 
trade in services such as disciplines in safeguards, subsidies, and domestic regulations. They 
also need to negotiate their specific commitments to different sectors of service. The pace 
at which the GATS’ framework is going to be developed will certainly depend on the 
perception of potential gains that liberalisation in service trade will bring.  
Despite the rapidly growing importance of the service sector and service trade in the 
economy, trade in services and its effect on economic growth and development have not 
been extensively analysed using a cross-country analysis.  Most of the studies focus on the 
relationship between service trade and income from a dynamic model. In other words, they 
look into the effect of trade liberalisation of service on growth of income. Mattoo et al. 
(2006) apply cross-country regressions of the growth rate of per capita Gross National 
Product (GNP) on standard growth control variables and different measures of openness for 
telecommunications and financial services. The authors found that openness in services 
influences long run growth performance. Arnold, Javorcik, and Mattoo (2011) and Arnold, 
Javorcik, Lipscomb, and Mattoo (2015) are two major recent contributions to the literature 
on the trade-income/growth nexus in service using firm-level data. Arnold et al. (2011) 
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document evidence that services sector reform improves performance of Czech firms in the 
downstream manufacturing sector. Arnold et al. (2014) establish empirical evidence that 
India’s policy reforms in services during the period 1993-2005 have a significant positive 
effect on the productivity of Indian manufacturing firms.   
To the best of my knowledge this research study is the first attempt to quantify the causal 
effect of the service trade on service income using a large sample of countries spanning the 
three recent periods, namely 2000, 2005, and 2010. I propose that if trade raises income at 
the aggregate level then service trade must also raise service income in the first place. Since 
the service sector represents the largest and increasing component of GDPs and the service 
trade has also been increasing over time, it is important to investigate the extent to which 
service trade causes service income. Methodologically, this research follows Frankel and 
Romer (1999), Irwin and Terviö (2003), and Noguer and Siscart (2005) to address the 
endogeneity due to reverse causality running from service income to service trade. For this 
purpose, in the second stage regression channels are controlled in addition to service trade 
via which geography affects income by including variables such as the distance to the 
equator, ethnic fraction, the percentage of population living in the tropics, labour quality, 
and internet access. As mentioned above, these additional control variables allow for factors 
that affect service income, not via their effect on service trade but rather via their effects on 
agricultural productivity, the health of the population, and institutional quality.  
This research’s findings illuminate the crucial role of the importance of export in services in 
enhancing nations’ wellbeing. The study findings show that trade in the service sector 
enhances service income. The causal effect of service trade on service income is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. As our estimation shows, a 1% point increase in the service trade 
share increases the per capita service income by 0.1% to 0.4%. The positive effect of service 
trade on service income is consistent and robust after I included various geographical and 
institutional controls specific to the service sector in order to address Rodriguez and Rodrik’s 
(2001) comment that geographical variables also affect income directly via their effect on a 
country’s productivity and health. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 deals with a review of related literature, 
while section 5.3 elaborates on the methodological frame work adopted for the study. 
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Section 5.4 presents the main findings of the analysis, while section 5.5 presents the 
conclusions. 
5.2 Trade in Services and Growth 
International trade has been always believed to be one of the major factors that enhance 
economic growth. A number of studies claimed finding strong evidence of a causal link 
between trade and economic growth (Dollar, 1992; Ben-David, 1993; Sachs et al., 1995 & 
Edwards, 1993). Like commodity trade in general, the literature reveals that service trade 
has a powerful influence on growth via several channels (Francois, 1990a & 1990b & 
Hoekman & Matto, 2008).  
The international trade literature asserts the positive impact of exports on economic growth 
(Rassekh, 2007; Noguer & Siscart, 2005; Irwin & Terviö, 2002 & Frankel & Romer, 1999). This 
claim is plausible given the fact that exports facilitate efficiency of production, better 
resource allocation, economies of scale, and efficient management style. Exports also enable 
imports of capital goods and essential raw materials, that in turn help to increase 
investments and output.  
Services such as telecommunications help the dissemination and diffusion of knowledge at 
a much lower cost.61  Trade in services and its effect on economic growth and development 
have not been extensively analysed using cross-country gravity analysis. However, there are 
a number of sub-sector or country-specific papers that study the effects of service trade on 
economic growth (Hoekman & Mattoo, 2008; Borrmann, Busse & Neuhaus, 2006; Arnold, 
Javorcik & Mattoo, 2011 & Arnold, Javorcik, Lipscomb & Mattoo, 2015). 
There is a very close link between trade in services and trade in goods.62 For example, an 
increase in manufacturing exports is expected to boost services exports due to the network 
effect as services such as transport, travel, communication, and business services are used 
61 The existence of the internet cuts communication costs significantly. In addition, business services such as accounting, 
engineering, consulting, and legal services are also important for growth, to the extent that they help to reduce the 
transaction costs associated with the operation of financial markets and the enforcement of contracts. 
62 The main differences between trade in goods and trade in services are: 1. services are intangible and perishable (i.e., 
non-storable); 2. in contrast to the exclusively cross-border mode for trade in goods, services can be provided at the location 
of the service supplier, at the location of the service consumer, or at neither of these two locations; 3. international trade 
in services usually requires movement of one or more factors of production, such as the commercial presence of a supplier 
at the location of the service consumer (movement of capital), or the transfer by the service supplier of personnel to the 
location of the service consumer (movement of labour); and 4. the national regulation level of trade in services is more 
extensive and diverse than the trade in goods. 
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as inputs. This is especially compelling since incorporation of knowledge-based business, 
financial, transport, and communication services in manufacturing production processes 
enhance productivity and hence international comparative advantages (Eichengreen & 
Gupta, 2013). Additionally, the financial sector development affects exports because it 
affects firms’ supply responses. Access to finance at a reasonable cost is important for export 
development for the simple reason that firms find it easier and less costly to finance working 
capital needs and upgrading and new innovative activities (Biggs, 2007; Aghion & Griffith, 
2005).  
Many empirical studies on the impact of service trade and growth can be broadly classified 
as case studies of specific countries, and focus on the impact of a component of the service 
sector (say the financial or communication sector) or liberalisation of the service sector on 
economic growth (Mattoo et al., 2006; Pagano, 1993; King & Levine, 1993; Guiso, Sapienza 
& Zingales, 2004; Berthelemy & Varoudakis, 1996 & Chandavarkar, 1992). 
Earlier studies on the relationship between trade and income are criticised on the grounds 
that they have drawbacks in establishing the causality between trade and income. Most 
investigations were criticised for the poor data quality and endogeneity since countries 
whose incomes are high for reasons other than trade may trade more (Edwards, 1993; Levine 
& Renelt, 1992 & Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2001).63  For example, countries with higher incomes 
may be better able to afford conducive infrastructure, overcome the informational search 
costs, or have relatively more tradable goods (López, 2005). The use of countries' trade 
policies as a proxy for trade share in the regression does not solve the problem as these 
policies are also likely to be correlated with factors that are omitted from the income 
equation (Sala-i-Martin,1991).  
There are a variety of theoretical models that have been proposed to analyse the link 
between financial depth and economic growth, and they have pointed to a positive 
connection between financial development and economic growth (King & Levin, 1993; 
Kletzer & Bardhan, 1987; Levine, 2005; and Roubini & Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Wise 
63 The critics of endogeneity problem in trade and growth literatures are addressed in the recent empirical literatures 
through the use of the instrument-variable (IV) regressions approach (Frankel & Romer, 1999; Irwin & Terviö, 2002; and 
Noguer & Siscart, 2005). This methodology allows to delve with endogeneity of trade openness to uncover the impact of 
international trade on per capita income. Noguer & Siscart (2005) further addressed the criticism of weak instrumentation 
by introducing latitude, tropics and institution as variables. 
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liberalisation of both the telecommunications and the financial services sectors is associated 
with an average growth rate 1.5% above the countries whose sectors aren’t liberalised 
(Mattoo et al, 2006). Studies show that there is a correlation between inward FDI and 
changes in policies towards financial and infrastructure services (Eschenbach & Hoekman, 
2006). 
Firm performance and the performance of service input industries have statistically 
significant positive relationships (Arnold, Mattoo & Narciso, 2006). The import of foreign 
factors that characterise services sector liberalisation could have positive effects because 
they are likely to bring technology with them. In other words, if greater technology transfer 
(the source of endogenous growth) accompanies services liberalisation, the stronger the 
growth effect will be. Moreover, studies show that the presence of foreign service providers 
as the measure of services policy is the most robust services variable affecting total factor 
productivity in user firms (Arnold, et. al., 2011). 
5.3 Data and method 
5.3.1 Data 
This research used data from bilateral service trade between 95 countries for the years 2000, 
2005, and 2010. The bilateral service trade data is available from the UN COMTRADE 
database, while the data on population, GDP, share of service to GDP, latitude, and distance 
from the equator is from WDI database. The service GDP variable is constructed by multiplying 
the share of the service to GDP ratio with the GDP. This research uses the WB’s index on the ease 
of doing business as a proxy for institutional quality. This index comprises of the following 
contents: ease of starting a business; dealing with construction permits; getting electricity; 
registering property; getting credit; protecting minority investors; paying taxes; trading 
across borders; enforcing contracts; and resolving insolvency. Given the range parameters it 
captures, the overall index is a good instrument to better measure a country’s institutional 
quality.  The data on distance between pair-countries and other geographical characteristics 
comes from CEEPI.  I captured skilled labour force (quality of labour of the nation) using the 
Human Development Report Office’s education index (lowest 0 and highest 1). Data for the 
telecommunications network comes from the WB database. Table 29 provides the 
descriptive statistics of the main variables. 
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Table 29: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log (Service_GDPi)  24.03 2.21 20.14 30.04 
Log (Service_Tradei) 18.33 3.03 5.89 25.39 
Log (Distance ij) 8.24 1.05 4.11 9.88 
Log (Pop i) 2.86 1.67 -2.21 7.20 
Log (Area i) 12.22 2.38 3.22 16.65 
Log (Pop j) 2.83 1.67 -2.95 7.20 
Log (Area j) 12.18 2.35 3.22 16.65 
Landlocked ij 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Latitudei 19.84 25.27 -41.81 67.47 
Tropical Areai 0.50 0.48 0 1 
Tropical Populationi 0.49 0.48 0 1 
Doing Business Easiness 58.61 13.81 26.95 88.83 
Labour Qualityi 0.60 0.19 0.18 0.92 
Ethnic Fractioni 43.59 30.40 0 93 
Broadband Interneti 8.60 11.23 0 38.09 
5.3.2 Estimation Method 
As indicated in Frankel and Romer (1999), Irwin and Terviö (2002), and Noguer and Siscart 
(2005), a country’s geographic attributes such as distance, landlocked, common border, 
population, and country size convey important information on the ‘expected’ volume of its 
trade with other countries. Interestingly, these variables are not important determinants of 
a country’s income. Additionally, a country’s income doesn’t affect these attributes. As a 
result, these geographic attributes can be taken as exogenous instruments for identifying 
trade’s impact on income. Given that here the research’s objective is to identify geographic 
influences on overall trade and a significant portion of countries’ trade is with their 
immediate neighbours, the research also includes interaction terms of all of the variables 
with the common-border dummy.64  
This research study follows the econometric strategy used in those studies to identify the 
effects of service trade on service income. Firstly, an instrument for international trade using 
64 The inclusion of interactions with the border dummy allows for the possibility that GDPs, populations…etc of 
neighbouring countries have much larger effects on a country’s service trade share than GDPs, populations…etc of non-
neighbouring countries. We also estimated using alternative specification where exclude the interaction terms in the first 
stage and the results remain essentially the same. 
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geographic variables was constructed and the following gravity-like equation of bilateral 
service trade was estimated:65  
௜ܶ௝ ؠ ܮ݋݃ ቆ
ܶݎܽ݀݁௜௝
ܩ݀݌௜ ቇ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܮ݋݃൫ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜௝൯ + ߙଶܮ݋݃(ܲ݋݌௜) 
                           +ߙଷܮ݋݃൫ܲ݋݌௝൯+ ߙସܮ݋݃(ܣݎ݁ܽ௜) + ߙହܮ݋݃൫ܣݎ݁ ௝ܽ൯+ ߙ଺ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝
+ ߙ଻ܤ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝ + ߙଵ଻ܮ݋݃൫ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜௝൯ כ ܤ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝ + ߙଶ଻ܮ݋݃(ܲ݋݌௜)
כ ܤ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝ + ߙଷ଻ܮ݋݃൫ܲ݋݌௝൯ כ ܤ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝ + ߙସ଻ܮ݋݃(ܣݎ݁ܽ௜) כ ܤ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝    
+ ߙହ଻ܮ݋݃൫ܣݎ݁ ௝ܽ൯ כ ܤ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝ + ߙ଺଻ܮ݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇݁݀௜௝ כ ܤ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝ + ߝ௜௝                   
                            =   ࢻᇱࢄ௜௝ + ߝ௜௝                                                                                  (5.1) 
where the right-hand side variables are defined as follows : 
Tradeij : the value of bilateral service trade between exporter i and importer j.  
Distanceij : the bilateral distance between them.  
Popi and Popj : the population of exporter i and importer j, respectively.  
Areai and Areaj :  the land areas exporter i and importer j, respectively. 
Borderij : dummy variable on whether the two countries share a common border.  
Landlockedij : dummy variable on whether either the exporter or the importer or both are 
landlocked countries. 
It is important to note that the research’s use of the gravity equation for service trade is 
justified both theoretically and empirically. Anderson, Milot, and Yotov (2014) set up a model 
of service trade in which a gravity equation was derived. Empirically, the gravity has been 
used successfully in many studies to investigate what determines the volume of bilateral 
service trade (Kimura & Lee, 2006 & Anderson et al., 2014).66 
Equation (5.1) allows us to construct the estimate the following component of country i's 
overall service trade share:  
෠ܶ௜ = σ ݁ࢻෝᇲࢄ೔ೕ௝ஷ௜                                                                    (5.2) 
65 In an alternative specification the research also excludes all the interactions from the first-stage specification as one of 
the robustness checks. See Appendix Table 2 for details on the correlation matrix of the dependent and explanatory 
variables of the first-stage regression.  
 
66 Specifically, Kimura and Lee (2006) rely on the gravity equation to investigate what determines bilateral services, trade, 
and goods between 10 OECD member countries and other economies for the years 1999 and 2000, while Anderson et al. 
(2014) estimate geographical barriers to trade in nine service categories for Canada's provinces from 1997 to 2007. 
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Thus, the constructed service trade share is the sum of geographical components of bilateral 
service trade with each of the foreign trading partners that are estimated from gravity of 
bilateral service trade (5.1).  
Next, the constructed service trade share in the following second stage gravity specification 
was used:  
ܮ݋݃ ቆܵ݁ݎݒீௗ௣௜ܲ݋݌௜ ቇ
= ߚଵ + ߚଶܮ݋݃( ෠ܶ௜) + ߚଷܮ݋݃(ܲ݋݌௜) + ߚସܮ݋݃(ܣݎ݁ܽ௜)
+ ࢼ૞࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙࢏+߳௜                                                    
(5.3)      
 where Controlsi denotes a vector of control variables such as region dummies (i.e. Latin 
America, East Asia, and SSA), latitude of the country,  the share of population living in tropics, 
and institutional quality measures. They can be included in a second-stage gravity equation 
(5.3) individually or together. As Noguer and Siscart (2005) pointed out, the inclusion of these 
control variables addresses Rodriguez and Rodrik’s (2001) critique that geographical 
independent variables in the first-stage gravity equation of bilateral service trade affects 
income via its effects on trade and on health, productivity, and institutions. 
5.4 Results 
Constructing the instrument 
Since this research relies on the 2SLS estimator, the quality of the instrument for the actual 
service trade share is of critical importance to identify the effect of service trade on service 
income. I now examine whether or not his instrument is a good one. The results of the first-
stage regression equation (5.1) are presented in Table 30 for three different years, namely 
2000, 2005, and 2010. Columns 1, 3, and 5 show the estimated coefficients and the standard 
errors on the variables other than the common border dummy and its interactions. The 
estimates of the common border and the interactions are shown in the second column. The 
results show that the first-stage regression generally performs well. Bilateral distance 
reduces trade, and either or both the exporter and the importer being landlocked reduces 
trade. The effect of the size of trading partner j strongly promotes bilateral service trade. 
The population of trading partner j promotes service trade, while the population of trading 
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partner i reduces it. Note that the effect of size on trade is expected to be nonlinear. The size 
of small economies is expected to increase trade because their domestic markets are small. 
Yet, when the size reaches a certain level, the domestic market becomes large enough that 
the country trades with itself, and its trade with the world decreases.67 
Table 30: Bilateral Service Trade 
 2000 2005 2010 
 Variables Interactions Variables Interactions Variables Interactions 
Log(Distance ij) -0.97*** 0.57 -1.29*** 0.95*** -1.23*** 0.55 
 (0.09) (0.96) (0.06) (0.44) (0.06) (0.46) 
Log (Pop i) -0.11 -0.87*** -0.01 -0.53*** -0.13*** -0.41** 
  (0.07) (0.24) (0.06) (0.14) (0.06) (0.17) 
Log(Area i) -0.08 0.97*** -0.17*** 0.28 -0.14*** 0.35* 
  (0.05) (0.45) (0.04) (0.20) (0.04) (0.20) 
Log (Pop j) 1.04*** -0.10 0.78*** -0.29 0.93*** -0.25 
  (0.07) (0.22) (0.06) (0.28) (0.06) (0.16) 
Log(Area j) -0.37*** -0.10 -0.33*** 0.09 -0.38*** 0.10 
  (0.05) (0.16) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.13) 
Landlocked ij -1.38*** 1.08*** -0.62*** 0.38* -0.18 0.03 
  (0.17) (0.33) (0.12) (0.23) (0.13) (0.22) 
Constant 16.84*** -10.49*** 20.61*** -7.35 20.47*** -5.96 
  (0.92) (3.20) (0.72 (1.64) (0.71) (1.80 
Observations 844 1435 1382 
R-squared 0.39 0.38 0.44 
MSE 2.14 2.21 2.14 
Note: Dependent variable: log of bilateral service trade to service GDP ratio. Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Table 31 indicates the results of the regression of the actual service trade share on the 
constructed service trade share. For all three samples, the instrument is found to be an 
important and precise determinant of the actual service trade share. It is important to point 
out that compared to Frankel and Romer (1999), the instrument of constructed service trade 
share provides much more information about actual service trade share than that contained 
in country size. The t-statistics of the coefficient estimates on service trade share takes 
values ranging between 11 and 22, which are three times larger than the corresponding t-
statistics obtained by Frankel and Romer (1999). These t-statistics correspond to F-statistics 
ranging between 121 and 484. These F-statistics are large enough to eliminate any concern 
that the finite-sample bias of instrumental variables is unlikely to be a serious problem in the 
67 Note that the same results were also obtained by Franker and Romer (1999) from their first-stage regression using 
aggregate trade data. This research established that this is not due to the multicollinearity among size variables. When the 
size measures are included separately in gravity equation (1), their sign remains the same in all cases.  
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IV regression. 68 Furthermore, the instrument is strong, as judged by the first stage F-
statistics that are by far larger than 10 (Stock & Yogo, 2005 & Staiger & Stock, 1997). 
Table 31: The relationship between actual and constructed service trade 
Independent variables 2000 2005 2010 
Constructed Service trade share 0.77*** 1.13*** 1.18*** 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) 
Ln population -0.10 -0.19* 0.19 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.16) 
Ln area 0.04 0.36*** -0.03 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) 
Constant 3.84*** -2.93** -2.45 
 (1.15) (1.22) (1.52) 
Observations 75 96 101 
R-squared 0.66 0.85 0.78 
Note: The dependent variable is the actual trade share. Robust standard errors are in parentheses   *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
The strength of the research’s instrument can be determined by examining Figures 1 to 6 
that show the correlation between the actual service trade share and its instrument, and the 
constructed service trade share for 2000, 2005, and 2010. Figures 16 to 18 depict the 
unconditional correlations between the two variables, while Figures 19 to 21 show the 
conditional correlations between them, after controlling for size measures. All the figures 
show a strong positive relationship between the actual service trade share and its instrument 
for all three years. Figures 19 to 21 show that even after controlling for size measures, the 
actual service trade share and its instrument are strongly correlated. The correlations 
between the actual service trade share and the constructed service trade share, after 
controlling for sizes, ranges between 0.78 and 0.85 for the three years 2000, 2005, and 2010, 
respectively. All the results taken together clearly lend credence to the use of geographical 
variables of the gravity equation to construct the instrument for the actual service trade 
share.  
Analysis of the Second-Stage Regression 
The results of the second-stage regression are presented in Table 32. For the purpose of 
comparison, Panel A presents the OLS regression results, while Panel B reports the 2SLS 
regression results. 
 
68 The values of the t-statistic and the F-statistic of the coefficient estimates of constructed trade share in Franker and 
Romer (1999) are only 3.63 and 13.1, respectively.  
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Table 32: Relationship of service trade and service per capita Income 
 2000 2005 2010 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: OLS          
Log (ServiceTrade ij) 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.37*** 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Log (Popi) -0.37** -0.28* -0.22 -0.14 -0.09 -0.11 -0.38*** -0.32*** -0.31*** 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Log (Areai) 0.18 0.14 0.10 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.26** 0.19* 0.23** 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Latitudei 0.01*   0.01*   0.01   
 (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Tropical Areai  -1.31***   -1.19***   -0.99***  
  (0.41)   (0.39)   (0.32)  
Latin America i   0.23   -0.10   -0.09 
   (0.47)   (0.40)   (0.3) 
East Asiai   -2.10***   -1.94***   -1.19** 
   (0.50)   (0.47)   (0.46) 
SSAi   -1.82***   -1.62***   -1.38*** 
   (0.67)   (0.44)   (0.41) 
Constant 5.48*** 6.12*** 5.02*** 6.09*** 7.36*** 6.35*** 5.54*** 6.86*** 6.29*** 
 (1.59) (1.48) (1.40) (1.28) (1.27) (1.19) (1.04) (1.05) (1.05) 
Observations 74 74 74 95 95 95 95 95 95 
R-Squared 0.27 0.34 0.45 0.41 0.44 0.55 0.51 0.54 0.59 
Panel B: 2SLS          
Log ( ෠ܶ௜) 0.50*** 0.43*** 0.52*** 0.33*** 0.26*** 0.31*** 0.42*** 0.34*** 0.41*** 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Log (Popi) -0.36** -0.29* -0.21 -0.14 -0.10 -0.11 -0.42*** -0.38*** -0.33*** 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Log (Areai) 0.18 0.15 0.09 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.26** 0.25** 0.25** 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Latitudei 0.01   0.01   0.01   
 (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Tropical 
Populationi 
 -1.18***   -0.99**   -0.55*  
  (0.42)   (0.42)   (0.37)  
Latin Americai   0.23   -0.10   -0.09 
   (0.47)   (0.40)   (0.3) 
East Asiai   -2.10***   -1.94***   -1.19** 
   (0.50)   (0.47)   (0.46) 
SSAi   -1.82***   -1.62***   -1.38*** 
   (0.67)   (0.44)   (0.41) 
Constant -1.17 4.48*** 2.96* 3.43* 5.84*** 4.68*** 3.15** 5.37*** 3.79*** 
 (2.49) (1.62) (1.57) (1.77) (1.37) (1.29) (1.35) (1.20) (1.28) 
Observations 74 74 74 95 95 95 95 95 95 
R-Squared 0.22 0.31 0.4 0.4 0.44 0.54 0.46 0.52 0.52 
Ratio of 2SLS/OLS 1.62 1.54 1.4 1.18 1.21 1.24 1.43 1.4 1.71 
Note: The dependent variable is the per capita service income. Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1  
 For each year the research study’s OLS and IV regressions include the actual service trade 
share, two size measures, and either the latitude of the country, or the percentage of the 
country in the tropics, or a set of dummies for East Asia, Latin America, and SSA. All these 
controls are included to address Rodriguez and Rodrik’s (2001) critique, according to which 
geographical variables affect income via their effect on trade and their effects on a country’s 
disease environment, its resource endowments, its agricultural productivity, and its quality 
of institutions. For example, a country’s latitude is a good control for its institutional quality, 
88 
 
due to the fact that Europeans who usually brought with them their style of institutions to 
their settlement countries favoured high-latitude countries. Similarly, the percentage of 
people living in tropics determine a country’s vulnerability to tropical diseases that may 
affect health of its people and thus its economic development. The inclusion of region 
dummies allows for the fact that some components of the effects of service trade on service 
per capita income may be region-specific.  
The results of this research’s OLS regressions show that the gravity-based model performs 
generally well.  A country’s latitude has a positive effect on its per capita service income for 
2000, 2005, and 2010. This finding is consistent with Hall and Jones’ (1999) argument that 
countries located in high latitude were more likely to be subject to European settlements 
that introduced better institutions. The percentage of people living in the tropics is found to 
have negative effect on per capita service income. This finding is line with Gallup et al. (1998) 
and McArthur and Sachs’s (2001) argument that countries with a large share of their 
population living in tropics are more vulnerable to tropical diseases that negatively impact 
their economic development.  This research’s explanatory variable of interest, the actual 
service trade share, has an expected strong positive effect on per capita service income. This 
effect is statistically significant at a 1% level for all gravity specifications. Specifically, a 10% 
increase in service trade share is associated with a 2% to 3% increase in per capita service 
income. The OLS regression results also show that on average service per capita income is 
largest in countries located in Latin America and much lower in countries located in SSA and 
East Asia especially.   
The OLS results are likely to be subject to endogeneity bias due the reverse causality running 
from service income to service trade. The 2SLS regressions address this problem of 
endogeneity. Panel B shows that the constructed service trade share has a positive effect on 
the service per capita income. This positive effect is robust to the inclusion of different 
control variables, and holds for 2000, 2005, and 2010. A 10% increase in the constructed 
service trade share causes a 2.6% to 5.2% increase in service per capita income. Importantly, 
this effect is statistically significant at a 1% level, with the t-statistics of its coefficient 
estimates ranging from 3 to 6. The IV regression results also confirm what the research 
established earlier using the OLS regressions:  the impact of service trade on service per 
capita income is largest in countries located in Latin America while it is much lower in 
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countries located in SSA and East Asia especially.   
I will now analyse the sensitivity of his estimate of the effect of service trade on service per 
capita income to a variety of controls for a country’s institutional quality. The four additional 
controls for institutional quality are measures of the ease of doing business, of labour quality, 
a dummy variable on whether or not the country has ethnic fraction and finally a measure 
of access to broadband internet per 100 individuals. All four of these variables represent 
different aspects of a country’s institutional quality that may affect service trade. For 
example, the WB’s index on the ease of doing business measures the extent to which a 
country’s regulations are friendly to business, including business related to service trade.  
The use of measures of labour quality and broadband internet access as controls for 
institutional quality is justified by the fact that service sector performance critically depends 
on human capital, the quality of the telecommunications network, and the quality of 
institutions (Shingal, 2010). Finally, the ethnic fraction dummy is included to control for 
institutional quality, especially for African countries where the ethnic divisions have been 
the major reason for their persistent underdevelopment (Easterly & Levine, 1997).  
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 The IV regression results with additional controls for institutional quality are 
presented in Table 33. Note that the results are only presented for the years 2005 
and 2010 because the WB’s data on the ease of doing business are only available 
from 2004. Additional variables such as controls for institutional quality are 
included first separately and then together. As expected, all measures of 
institutional quality, except the dummy on ethnic fraction, are found to have 
positive effects on the service per capita income.  The positive effects of service 
trade share on service income hold for every gravity specification. A 1% point 
increase in service trade share causes a 0.1% to 0.2% increase in service income. 
In all regressions, this positive effect of service trade share is statistically significant 
at the 1% level in most of the cases. Taken together, all the results show that the 
effect of service trade on service income is robust and economically and 
statistically significant.  
I also checked the stability and consistency after controlling for country and time 
fixed effects and arrive to similar conclusion. The inference I made in the previous 
sections remains the same (Table 34).  
Table 34: Estimation results of the fixed effect models 
 Fixed Effect 
VARIABLES 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Log( ) 0.07** 0.07** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.07** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Log(Popi) -1.09** -1.09** -1.10** -1.19*** -0.54 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) 
Institutionsi    0.02*** 
    (0.01) 
Labour Qualityi   2.84***  3.24*** 
   (1.017)  (0.97) 
Internet usersi   -0.002 -0.001 
   (0.003) (0.002) 
Merchandise trade to GDP 
Ratioi 
-0.02 -0.0148 -0.17 0.04 -0.27 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) 
Constant 18.17*** 18.17*** 16.31*** 19.26*** 9.84** 
 (4.29) (4.29) (4.63) (4.54) (4.81) 
Observations 264 264 259 260 255 
N 113 113 112 112 111 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The dependent variable is the service per capita income. Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1
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 5.5 Conclusion 
The 21st century’s world economy is predominantly service related. This trend is 
likely to strengthen over time. In 2014, 71% of the world’s GDP was produced in 
the service sector. The service sector is not only the largest sector in the economy 
but is also its fasting-growing sector. Despite these facts, the empirical literature 
on the effect of service trade on a country’s real income is missing. Using a rich 
data set of bilateral service trade, this paper estimates the causal effect of service 
trade on service per capita income for 95 countries in 2000, 2005, and 2010. This 
research study first shows that the estimate of the geographical component of the 
overall service trade share, which is obtained from the gravity equation of bilateral 
service trade, is a very powerful instrument for measuring the actual service trade 
share. This research has established that the impact of service trade on per capita 
service income is economically and statistically significant at the 1% level. A 1% 
point increase in the service trade share causes a 0.1% to 0.4% increase in the 
service per capita income. The result is robust with the inclusion of various 
geographical and institutional controls specific to the service sector.  
  
5.6 Annexure 
A1. Quality of the instrument constructed 
Figure 16:  Relationship between the actual service trade share and the 
constructed service trade share in 2000 
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 Figure 17:  Relationship between the actual service trade share and the 
constructed service trade share in 2005 
 
Figure 18:  Relationship between the actual service trade share and the 
constructed service trade share in 2010 
 
Figure 19:  Relation between the actual service trade share and 
 the constructed service trade share in 2000 
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 Figure 20:  Relation between the actual service trade share and the constructed 
service trade share in 2005 after controlling for size measures 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Relation between the actual service trade share and the constructed 
service trade share in 2010 after controlling for size measures 
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 A2. List of countries in the sample 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,  Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo Rep., Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Fiji, France, Germany, Guinea, Georgia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iceland, Iran, Italy, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, Kenya, Korea Rep., Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, 
Madagascar, Maldives, Malaysia, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Moldova, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Netherlands, 
Norway, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Paraguay, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, 
Slovak Republic, Saudi Arabia, Spain,  Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden,  Switzerland, 
Swaziland, Syria, Togo, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Vietnam, South Africa, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
A3. The importance of the service sector 
The relative share of the service sector to the GDP is growing rapidly for all countries in 
all income groups. The elastic income elasticity of demand and limited scope for labour 
productivity improvements in the supply of services explains the rapid expansion of the 
services intensity of economies. As the number one contributor to the GDP for all 
countries in all income groups, the service sector’s contribution to the GDP for all income 
groups is significant, and its importance rises with the country’s income level. As the WB 
data shows, the service to GDP ratio in the lowest income countries is about 35%, while 
it rises to more than 70% of national income and employment in developed countries 
(Figure 22; Tables 36-37, and Figures 24-29).  
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 Figure 22: Contributions of sectors as a percentage of the GDP 
Source: WB’s WDI 
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 The share of services in the GDP and employment rises as per capita income increases. 
The service sector’s contribution to employment is also significant. More than 74% of 
employees in high income countries are employed in the service sector, while roughly 
30% of employees in low income countries are employed in the service sector (Figure 23).  
Figure 23: Importance of the service sector in the economy 
   
% GDP in 2012 % employment in 2010 Service Trade (% GDP) 2012 
 Source: WB’s WDI database 
 
The statistics from WB’s WDI database reveals that trade of services as a percentage of 
the GDP is about 20% of the GDP in high-income countries, while it is about 8% in low- 
and medium-income countries. Recently, the improvements in information and 
communication technologies have significantly enhanced cross-border trade in labour-
intensive services. 
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 Table36: Service sector contributions as a percentage of the GDP in 2012 
Region Service to GDP ratio 
Arab World 44.44 
East Asia & Pacific (all income levels) 62.96 
East Asia & Pacific (developing only) 43.87 
European Union 73.72 
High income 74.07 
High income: OECD 74.83 
High income: non-OECD 60.99 
Least developed countries: UN classification 46.42 
Low income 49.10 
Lower middle income 51.78 
Middle income 53.42 
OECD members 74.35 
Other small states 57.94 
Pacific island small states 67.53 
Small states 60.62 
Sub-Saharan Africa (all income levels) 56.42 
Upper middle income 53.95 
World 70.24 
Source: WB’s WDI database 
 
Table 37: Trade in services as a percentage of the GDP by region in 2012 
Region Trade in service to GDP ratio 
European Union 18.28 
High income 12.37 
High income: OECD 11.66 
High income: non OECD 22.95 
Least developed countries: UN classification 14.24 
Low income 13.90 
Lower middle income 13.17 
Middle East & North Africa (all income levels) 18.06 
Middle income 9.54 
OECD members 11.46 
Other small states 27.37 
Pacific island small states 43.98 
Small states 30.05 
South Asia 12.77 
Sub-Saharan Africa (all income levels) 12.60 
Upper middle income 8.45 
World 11.62 
Source: WB’s WDI database 
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 A4. The four modes of supply  
The key difference between trade in goods and services in terms of their growth impact 
stems from the fact that “imports” of services must be locally produced. There are four 
modes of service supply. They are discussed as follows. 
Mode one: Cross-border supply  
This mode covers services flows from the territory of one country into the territory of 
another country. Examples of such services include banking or architectural services 
transmitted via telecommunications or mail. This mode of delivery is the most similar to 
trade in goods in that the service is supplied from abroad. In other words, the factors of 
production do not have to move to meet the consumer. Advances in technology have 
made it easier to access cross-border supply of services. For example, internet advances 
make it easy to supply distance education to areas where previously it was not feasible to 
supply. Similarly, advances in fast internet connectivity makes it easier for highly skilled 
medical professionals to deliver their services to remote patients. However, the advance 
in technology of supplying services makes it harder to regulate the cross-border supply 
(Brown & Stern, 2001).  
Mode two: Consumption abroad  
Consumption abroad refers to situations where a service consumer such as tourist, 
students, or patient moves into another country’s territory to obtain a service. The main 
restrictions on consumption abroad are controls on the movement of currency and 
people, for example, the limits on the amount of currency allowed to cross borders and 
the visas required for students or tourists restricts consumption of services abroad.  
Mode three: Commercial presence  
Commercial presence implies that a service supplier of one country establishes a 
territorial presence, through ownership or lease of premises, in another country's 
territory to provide a service such as domestic subsidiaries of foreign insurance 
companies, banks, or hotel chains.  In other words, the foreign providers of the services 
establish a local branch and supply to the local market from within the country’s borders. 
Meaning that the production factors come into contact with the consumers, which is not 
the case in the trade of goods. As a result foreign firms’ requirement to own the local 
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 branch, this mode of service trade also generates FDI that benefits the host country. To 
protect strategic sectors, host countries may restrict FDI by placing restrictions on market 
access and ownership, and control restrictions and operational restrictions or outright 
bans on FDI on strategic sectors and many others (Brown & Stern, 2000). Restrictions 
could also require foreign firms to export a certain percentage of output, to meet local 
content and training quotas, and to restrict the repatriation of profits.  
Mode four: Movement of natural persons  
Movement of natural persons consists of persons of one country entering the territory of 
another country to supply a service. Most countries are open to temporary and 
permanent immigration of skilled workers, such as accountants, doctors, or teachers. This 
mode includes self-employed persons and employees on temporary assignment (intra-
corporate transferees). There are a number of barriers to this type of service export, 
including immigration regulations and refusing to recognise the qualifications of foreign 
suppliers. Regulations restricting the entry of foreigners can determine the level of such 
service imports or exports through this mode. The remittances made by the workers is 
the benefit that the originating country receives.69  
A5. Determinants of trade in services  
The major determinants of trade in services are market size, members in regional trade 
agreements, distance, restrictive regulations, and common language.  Additionally, trade 
in goods, the presence of an English-speaking workforce, quality of infrastructure, the 
openness of the trade policy regime toward the various modes of services delivery, cost 
of human capital, common legal systems, human capital, tele-density, and trade 
restrictiveness also affect trade in services. The export demand of services is also 
influenced by the conditions prevailing in the world market that influence trade in 
services. The demand for nations’ services exports is larger when the level of foreign real 
income is higher. Moreover, some studies indicate that price elasticities for trade in 
services are smaller than those for merchandise trade. In addition, from the service 
category, travel-related services are more elastic while business services are relatively 
69 However, remittances often do not occur, especially in developing countries, that leads to the problem of what is 
known as the ‘brain drain’. 
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 inelastic (Shingal, 2010; Kimura & Lee, 2006; Eichengreen & Gupta, 2013 and Pain & van 
Welsum, 2005). 
The positive relationship between infrastructure development and services export 
performance is also documented in empirical researches. A well-functioning 
infrastructure, including electric power, road and rail connectivity, telecommunications, 
air transport, and efficient ports are essential to sustain the rapid growth of services 
exports. The number of graduates and the Information Communication Technology (ICT) 
infrastructure in emerging countries are amongst the key factors in modern services 
exports (Nasir & Kalirajan, 2013 and Van der Marel, 2012). Human capital is essential for 
technology transfer and learning that in turn enhances export growth and diversification 
(Hausmann, Hwang & Rodrik, 2007; UNCTAD, 2005; Eichengreen & Gupta, 2011 & Shingal, 
2010).  
The empirical trade in services’ literature used a different proxy of trade barriers in 
services exports, such as the services trade restrictiveness index (Grünfeld and Moxnes, 
2003), the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index (Kimura and Lee, 2006), and ICT 
(Nasir & Kalirajan, 2013). It has also been shown that institutional quality is highly 
correlated to trade (Francois & Manchin, 2006 & Dollar & Kraay, 2003). Institutions might 
also indirectly affect trade through their impact on other variables that determine trade 
flows, such as investment and productivity (Méon & Sekkat, 2008). Weak and missing 
institutions limit firms’ ability to take advantage of new trading opportunities (Stiglitz & 
Charlton, 2005 & Biggs, 2007). The quality of institutions could represent the degree of 
corruption, complexity of export procedures and rigidity in employment law (Lennon, 
2008; Kimura & Lee, 2006). 
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 Figure 24: Trade in services as a percentage of the GDP in 2010 
Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org 
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 Figure 25: Merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP in 2010 
Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org 
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 Figure 26: Trade as a percentage of the GDP in 2010 
Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org 
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 Figure 27: Import of goods and services as a percentage of GDP in 2010 
Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org 
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 Figure 28: Export of goods and services as a percentage of GDP in 2010 
Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org 
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 Figure 29: Personal remittances as a percentage of GDP in 2010 
Source: WITS UNSD COMTRADE http://wits.worldbank.org 
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 VI. Conclusions 
The thesis examines issues such as factors affecting international trade and the impact of 
trade on national income, especially of African countries. It composes four essays with 
each of them exploring one trade related topic. The general theoretical framework used 
throughout is a gravity equation model and the empirical methods for dealing with data 
is either fixed effect, two stage least squares or least square estimation. The main 
conclusions reached are summarized as follows. 
(1) This research established that the reciprocal trade agreements tend to increase 
members’ exports, while the non-reciprocal trade agreements decrease exports. This 
research also established that both reciprocal and non-reciprocal trade agreements 
perform worst in Africa. The result is plausible, given that the export share is stagnated at 
around 10% among African countries over decades. The growth fostering potential of 
reciprocal trade agreements in Africa is almost untapped, and this untapped potential 
could spur growth. According to a World Bank (WB) study, African food imports elsewhere 
has a trade value of up to $52 billion a year.  Broad and deep reciprocal trade agreements 
in Africa have the potential to enable the region to replace its food imports from outside 
of Africa. Moreover, broadening and deepening the reciprocal trade agreements can 
potentially spur the intra-African export of manufacturing products, since most African 
countries are at the same stage of development and share product preferences. This 
research’s findings are comparable to those of Goldstein et al. (2007) and Özden & 
Reinhardt (2005) regarding the relative effect of reciprocal and non-reciprocal trade 
agreements on African export performance. However, it contradicts Gil-Pareja et al.’s 
(2014) results. The main reason for trade reduction of non-reciprocal PTAs might be 
stringent NTBs, like the rule of origin and related restrictions. Studies such as Candau & 
Jean (2005), Hoekman & Özden (2005), Mold (2005), and Grant & Lambert (2008) also 
show that due to NTBs, fewer opportunities are utilised in relation to what opportunities 
are available, although countries mostly tend to use the preference granted to export 
their products. 
(2) The research established that African trade blocs are important in increasing their 
members’ exports, albeit with varying degree of effectiveness.  African regional trade 
agreements have positive and significant impacts on intra-African exports. Nevertheless, 
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 the resultant trade flow relative to the total African export to the world is very small. 
Africa has the potential to cover its food needs through intra-African trade, but at the 
moment Africa is importing 95% of its food needs from elsewhere. As the WB study 
indicates, this is a loss of more than $52 billion a year in trade in values that Africa could 
potentially retain within its borders. This reveals that Africa is the only region on earth 
that lags behind in creating broad regional trading blocs. As such, the growth-fostering 
potential of trade blocs in Africa is almost untapped. The creation of wider and deeper 
efficient regional trading blocs can significantly spur African growth.  Regional trade blocs 
are crucial elsewhere in promoting export and fostering economic growth and prosperity. 
For example, studies indicate that had EU not integrated five decades ago, the average 
per capita income of each country would have been one-fifth lower than it is today 
(Baldwin, 1994 & Sarker & Jayasinghe, 2007). This implies that deepening and widening 
the regional integration in Africa has a significant potential to spur the exports and 
economic growth of member countries.   
(3) This research’s results reveal that African migrants do not have a statistically significant 
impact on their home country’s exports. Conversely, Asian migrants promote their home 
countries’ exports to their destinations. Specifically, this research study’s results show 
that a 10% increase in the number of Asian migrants increases their home country exports 
to the migrants’ destination countries by 0.7%. Both African and Asian migrants are found 
to have a positive and significant impact on their home countries’ imports from their 
destination countries for both total and differentiated products. Given the differences in 
the structure of the export sectors and the main reasons for migration in Africa and Asia, 
I conclude that it might be the home country’s export sector structure and not the reason 
for migration that mainly influences migrants’ ability to work as bridges between traders 
from their home and destination countries. 
(4) This research study first shows that the estimate of the geographical component of 
the overall service trade share, which is obtained from the gravity equation of bilateral 
service trade, is a very powerful instrument for measuring the actual service trade share. 
This research has established that the impact of service trade on per capita service income 
is economically and statistically significant at the 1% level. A 1% point increase in the 
service trade share causes a 0.1% to 0.4% increase in the service per capita income. The 
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 result is robust with the inclusion of various geographical and institutional controls 
specific to the service sector.  
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